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chapter 5
Peasant Mode of Production and the Evolution of
Clientelar Relations
Laura da Graca
In order to characterise the relatively autonomous peasant societies that pre-
dominated in the early Middle Ages after the collapse of the state, Chris Wick-
ham has proposed the concept of ‘peasant mode of production’.1 This concept
refines his earlier category of ‘peasant-based society’, which the author presen-
ted as ‘deliberately anodyne’, better than the notions of ‘tribal’, ‘primitive com-
munal’ or ‘kin-based’ societies, less naïve and restricted than that of ‘Germanic
society’ inspired inTacitus, and close to that of ‘rank society’ by reasonof its dis-
tinctness from societies with class antagonism, which it shares with the former
types, and its clearer recognition of internal hierarchies.2 This perspective has
furnished a paradigm for the analysis of the earlyMiddle Ages societies as parts
of a coherent whole, which justifies a reworking of the category of peasant-
based society in termsofmodeof production, a taskundertakenbyWickham in
Framing the EarlyMiddle Ages (a peasant-based society would be a social form-
ation dominated by the peasant mode of production). However, the author’s
theoretical approach has had less of an impact than his achievements in the
field of comparative studies and empirical research.
Although he proposes a new mode of production, Wickham does not go to
great lengths in order to formulate its contents in the language of historical
materialism and the traditions he admittedly draws from (mainly economic
anthropology). Theway the issue is presented – coupledwith themistrust with
which a new mode of production is regarded – undoubtedly have had some
bearing on the adoption of the concept by Marxist historians, who prefer the
less precise but broader concept of peasant-based society. In order to contrib-
ute to anassessment ofWickham’s proposal, the first sectionof this analysiswill
1 Wickham 2005, pp. 535–50. For a summarised account of Wickham’s concept of the peasant
mode of production, see ‘Passages to Feudalism inMedieval Scandinavia’ in this book. Iwould
like to expressmy gratitude to ChrisWickham, Carlos Astarita andOctavio Colombo for their
comments on this text.
2 Wickham 1994d, pp. 216–17.
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attempt a systematisation of the concept of the peasant mode of production.
Given that the peasant mode, considered in isolation, corresponds to classless
societies, we will follow Godelier’s guidelines on the components of a mode of
production in ‘primitive’ societies, i.e. the elements that must be encompassed
in the concept, or else the aspects to be studied when determining the mode
or modes of production in a given society. Some traits of the peasant mode not
explicitly stated byWickhamhave been gleaned through deduction; others are
inferred from the development of empirical cases, Malling’s imaginary village
among others, where the author exemplifies the proposed concept and his
general paradigm for analysis.3 In this sense, since we will refer to empirical
examples, Wickham’s methodological perspective on the peasant mode as an
ideal type will be replaced by another one in which the concept shall be
reconstructed as a real abstraction, that is to say, not as a model but as a
structure of reality.4 This reconstruction, though based on Wickham’s data, is
still interpretive; indeed, the analysis yields elements not taken for granted (or
even rejected) by the author, for example, the centrality of the Germanicmode
of the Formen as property type.
We will then address the problem of clientelar relations between members
of the feudal aristocracy and the peasantry, which in Wickham’s proposal
constitutes the main articulation mechanism between modes of production
and a vehicle for the transformationof peasant societies.Wewill avail ourselves
of the benefactoria, a documented form of patronage found in the North of
Spain during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in order to examine how
clientelar bonds underwent a transformation into relations of exploitation.5
Wewill posit that these bonds express social practices derived from thepeasant
mode, and that while they preserve their original appearance, their content
tends to become subordinate to the dominant feudal logic of the area. Our
analysis suggests that this transformation, which goes through different stages,
3 Wickham 2005, pp. 428–34.
4 These criteria are in Dhoquois 1973, among others. The use of ideal types has been criticised
in daGraca 2008, where it is argued that themanner inwhich the universal term is elaborated
may condition the exploration of phenomena and the conclusions drawn from the analysis.
This is apparent, for instance, inWickham’s assessment of aristocratic wealth levels in North-
ern France based on an ideal type of ‘aristocracy’, which leads him to emphasise nominal
landowning over effective exploitation of lands.
5 The benefactoria has been considered as a lax social relation, in general terms, by Sánchez
Albornoz 1976a and Estepa Díez 2003, pp. 39–80; a different approach appears in Martínez
Sopena 1987, pp. 50ff., andMartínezGarcía 2008, who equates servitiumwith serfdom.On the
ambivalentmeaning of theword servitium in the earlyMiddle Ages, seeDavis 1996, pp. 227–8.
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is one of the mechanisms for feudal expansion over free spaces, and that the
slow pace of change and its concrete manifestations result from the relative
validity of the functioning principles of the peasant mode.
Some critics of the concept of the peasantmode of production have found it
lacking in its ability to explain the change toward the dominance of another
mode of production, and they have alleged that Wickham has not proved
in a satisfactory manner how this transformation occurs.6 Notwithstanding
that opinion, it will be demonstrated herein that the implied dynamic of the
peasant mode can explain structural change and the manners in which it
occurs, and that the process can be documented.
In order to further our analysis of social practice, we will resort to the
information about peasant societies contained in ‘family sagas’.7
Wickham’s Concept of the Peasant Mode of Production
According to Godelier’s synthesis, the analysis of a society in terms of its mode
of production must account for the productive forces that converge into the
productiveprocess and for the relationsof production implicit in suchprocess.8
In the Formen, this criterion is subordinated to a specific form of property:
Now this unity, which in one sense appears as the particular form of
property, has its living reality in a specific mode of production itself, and
this appears equally as the relationship of the individuals to one another
and as their specific daily behaviour towards inorganic nature, their spe-
cific mode of labour (which is always family labour and often communal
labour).9
6 Davidson 2011; Harman 2011.
7 On the historical value of Icelandic sagas, see Chris Wickham’s chapter in this book.
8 Godelier 1974c.
9 Marx 1964, p. 94. Hindess and Hirst 1975, p. 125, follow these criteria: ‘mode of production
= an articulated combination of specific mode of appropriation of the social product and a
specificmodeof appropriationof nature.Amodeof production is a complexunity of relations
and forces of production: the mode of appropriation of the product is determined by the
relations of production, that is, by the social distribution of the means of production, and by
the distribution of the agents to definite positions (labourers, non-labourers) as a function of
the former distribution’.
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In keepingwithGodelier’s approach, the study of amodeof productionmust
be grounded in the analysis of the production process of the dominant branch
of production, which in turn necessitates establishing the features of the unit
of production and the domestic group, the social forms of labour (cooperation
and division of labour), the technical development of themeans of labour, and
an estimation of productivity and intensity of labour, considering an untapped
productive potential, the conditions for its mobilisation and the demography
associated with the development of productive forces; the examination must
identify the mode of appropriation of the conditions of production and the
social product, which is expressed in a specific form of property, as well as
the form of circulation of products, which is a result of the social relations.10
Lastly, the structural analysis must uncover the internal logic of the mode of
production, that is to say, the laws that govern its functioning, and the histor-
ical conditions of its genesis, reproduction and transformation (in the case of
‘primitive’ societies, the emergence of relations of exploitation).11 For the study
of societies presenting more than one mode of production, Godelier resorts to
the concept of social formation, which in his view calls for ascertaining both
themanner of articulation amongmodes of production and which is the dom-
inant one.12
Let us proceed to explore the features of the peasant mode of production
based on this analytical scheme. In the peasant mode, the main productive
activity is agriculture and that is its starting point, as opposed to other analog-
10 Godelier 1974c. Demography is included in the analysis of a mode of production in Marx
1965, p. 438: ‘The labouringpopulation therefore produces, alongwith the accumulationof
capital producedby it, themeans bywhich it itself ismade relatively superfluous, is turned
into a relative surplus population; and it does this to an always increasing extent. This is a
law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production; and in fact every special
historic mode of production has its own laws of population, historically valid within its
limits alone’.
11 Godelier 1974a. Kuchenbuch and Michael 1977 offer a similar scheme for the analysis of
a mode of production, with the variations inherent to a class society. The analysis begins
with an examination of the productive forceswhich are applied in the production process;
the form in which producers are combined with the means of production determines the
form of surplus appropriation; this is expressed in specific property relations, which in
turn shape a particular class structure [ständische Klassen] because of the role played
by political coercion in social reproduction; exchange is considered as logically derived
from social relations; finally, the analysis of the feudal mode of production accounts for
its transformation (the arising of capitalist social relations).
12 Godelier 1974c. For further development of this approach to thenotion of social formation,
see Glucksmann 1973.
162 da graca
ous concepts which do not exclude pastoral-nomad or hunter-gatherer societ-
ies, such as Sahlins’s domestic mode of production.13 Land is the most import-
antmeans of production and the labour force comesmainly from themembers
of the family. The unit of production is the individual household, which con-
trols the conditions of production. The prevailing division of labour is that
which is established naturally by gender and generation within the household,
and there exist forms of simple cooperation whose development depends on
the settlement patterns. Complex forms of cooperation are limited, as well
as craft specialisation. The household consists basically of one nuclear fam-
ily, and it includes non-family members (free or unfree servants) who fulfil
auxiliary functions or collaborate in agricultural taskswithout implying awith-
drawal from productive work for the other members of the household.14 This
circumstance precludes from positing a situation of class-exploitation within
the household.
In the peasant mode, agricultural technology is relatively simple and the
intensity of labour is low because there are no social reasons for the intensive
use of the productive forces.15 Sahlins’s principles with regard to the low pro-
ductive intensity of the domestic mode of production apply, and these are in
turn based on Chayanov’s premise that the labour force of the peasant house-
hold is not fully tapped.16 This issue has been addressed by Ester Boserup,
who associates agricultural intensification with demographic growth. Boserup
observes that primitive cultivators (a) work fewer hours and less regularly than
their counterparts in densely populated regions; (b) do not consider agricul-
tural work as pleasant, limiting it to the minimum necessary; (c) are generally
not unaware of the existence of more sophisticated tools and alternative cul-
tivation methods whose application would imply an intensification of labour
13 Sahlins 1972.
14 This situation is verified in medieval Iceland, which is the main reference used in the
construction of the concept of the peasant mode. See Karras 1988, p. 81.
15 Both Davidson 2011, p. 91, and Harman 2011, p. 104 suggest a parallel between the function-
ing of the peasantmode andBrenner’s conception of feudal peasantry, according towhich
the predominance of rules of economic behaviour that are contrary to innovation determ-
ines the impossibility of an internal transformational dynamic. Davidson infers that the
concept of the peasantmode (aswell as Brenner’s notion of feudalism) cannot explain the
change toward another mode of production. For Harman, even classless societies present
developments in their productive forces thatmay precipitate structural change, and in his
view the level of productive forces in the peasant mode resembles more that of the class
societies with which it coexists.
16 Sahlins 1972, pp. 87–92.
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they deem inconvenient; (d) prefer to forgo those options unless population
growth threatens subsistence. In conclusion, there is a margin for intensifying
production in response to population growth (or the introduction of relations
of exploitation).17 These premises lead to a demography that is specific to the
peasantmodewhich implies anuntapped surplus that canbemobilised in situ-
ations of demographic pressure, something that peasant populations attempt
to preclude through birth control strategies (mainly late marriage); contrary to
Malthus’s assertion, this demographic regulation would be put to use in order
toprevent labour intensification rather than tomitigate the effects of the imbal-
ance between population and resources. These reproductive patterns result in
low demographic density and a tendency toward population decline due to the
decrease in birth rate, which is confirmed for the historical period of domin-
ance of the peasant mode.18
In the peasant mode, the household produces autonomously and the prod-
uct of labour remains at its disposal. This essential feature distinguishes the
peasant mode from the concept of peasant economy derived from Chayanov’s
arguments, to which some authors have conferred the status of mode of pro-
duction,19 andwhose functioning is independent from the eventual subjection
of peasants to relations of exploitation. It is also distinct from thepeasantmode
of production referred to by Kautsky and other authors, who point to a form of
production that is articulated to other systems rather than to specific relations
of production.20
Sinceproducers donot have to relinquish the surplus to an exploitative class,
the most important social relations in the peasant mode are those established
within the household (which do not imply class-exploitation) and between
the independent households. These bonds determine a specific form of prop-
erty that is not subordinated to kinship relations nor mediated through the
community, and whose continuity is guaranteed mainly through systems of
partible inheritance.21 Given that for the most part the access to the means
17 Boserup 1993, p. 43, defines agricultural intensification as ‘the gradual change towards
patterns of land use which make it possible to crop a given area of land more frequently
than before’.
18 Wickham 2005, pp. 551 ff.
19 According to Harrison 1977, Chayanov’s theory involves social relations of production
(self-exploitation of labour power), mechanisms for reproduction (the family), and a
specific dynamic derived from the contradiction between consumption needs and forces
of production.
20 Kautsky 1970, p. 320. On this notion, see Banaji 2010, pp. 94–5.
21 Wickham 2005, pp. 551 ff., p. 432 (the case of Malling) and p. 324 (England).
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of production does not depend on membership in a community, the peasant
mode is distinct fromconcepts based on kinship societies such asMeillassoux’s
domestic mode of production.22
Basically, the form of property in the peasant mode corresponds to that of
the Germanic mode of the Formen due to the following considerations: (a) the
individual household is an independent economic unit; (b) from the point of
view of real appropriation of the conditions of production and its results, the
direct producers are private proprietors; (c) the community does not exist as
a state; (d) communal property is only a complement of individual property;
(e) kinship has a secondary role; (f) exploitation is parcelled out and does
not require communal labour for its valorisation; and (g) it develops feudal
relations of production.23
The forms of production and the fact that the households dispose of the
product determine the characteristics of exchange, which is based on recipro-
city: the productive units exchange goods in order to create or maintain social
bonds and to obtainwhat they do not produce.24 Commercial exchange ismar-
ginal. Sahlins’s criterion applies, according to which: (a) in ‘primitive’ societies,
the households are not self-sufficient andmust resort to exchange; (b) systems
based on domestic production, sexual division of labour, an orientation toward
consumption and product access tend toward reciprocity; and (c) transactions
have an instrumental function.25
In the peasant mode, the exchange signifies cooperation, alliance and com-
petition among households, and the quality of the exchange depends on the
social distance (the closer to the household, the more disinterested or less
‘economic’ the exchange).26 The surplus is also consumed in collective celebra-
tions. Generosity is a mechanism for constructing hierarchies, since it imposes
a debt on the recipients and creates a social relationship which on principle
is to last until the gift is returned. Differences of rank in the peasant mode
derive from this operative principle by which the gift-giver has a position of
power: those who give more have more recognition and subordinate others by
means of the obligation to repay the gift. This takes upMarcelMauss’s criterion,
according towhich the act of givingmore thanothers – the essenceofpotlatch–
is a mechanism to express superiority and legitimise or conquer a social posi-
22 Meillassoux 1991, pp. 34ff.
23 Marx 1964, pp. 77–80.
24 According to Sahlins 1972, ch. 5, ‘generalized reciprocity’ and ‘balanced reciprocity’,
respectively.
25 Sahlins 1972, p. 83 and ch. 5.
26 Sahlins 1972, ch. 5; Bourdieu 1990, p. 115.
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tion before others,27 and Bourdieu’s proposition that due to social disapproval
of openviolence, gift-giving is theonlymeans to assuredomination inprimitive
societies.28 As Sahlins summarises it, ‘the economic relation of giver-receiver is
the political relation of leader-follower’.29
This form of distribution of the surplus defines the features of the social
structure: peasant mode societies are not egalitarian because they have mech-
anisms to construct hierarchy. However, dependent as they are on generosity,
charisma, public performance, etc., thesehierarchies arenotpermanent, and in
consequence this mode of production is correlated to unstable political forms.
Inequality is also manifested by the presence of unfree individuals in the more
hierarchical units.
The peasant mode implies functioning principles that work against the
accumulation of wealth and power inasmuch as the construction and pre-
servation of a position of authority depend on munificence, which leads to a
constant draining of resources, and on the effective support of followers, which
inhibits the deployment of oppressive practices. This problemhas been formu-
lated in different ways: the contradiction between a leader’s power aspirations
and his dependence on his subordinates, which is inherent to primitive lead-
erships, neutralises the possible development of said power (Sahlins);30 the
accumulation of symbolic capital, the only recognised form of power, demands
costly strategies, therefore the very maintenance of domination implies its fra-
gility (Bourdieu);31 social competition does not involve factors of production
but scarce goods that only bestowprestige if they are redistributed or destroyed
in public ceremonies (Godelier).32 This dynamic leads to limited standards of
wealth and preservation of the means of production and subsistence on the
part of the members of the community, which in turn prevents its internal dif-
ferentiation.
27 Mauss 1954, pp. 37–41 and 72. Godelier 1999, pp. 56ff., expounds and criticises Mauss’s
model. For the negotiation of social position through gift-exchange, see Miller 1986.
28 Bourdieu 1990, pp. 122–35.
29 Sahlins 1972, p. 133.
30 Sahlins 1974, and 1972, pp. 130–48. Runciman 1989, pp. 323–5, follows Sahlins’s criterion:
‘The practices which define the big-man’s role do indeed impose the constraint – or
contradiction – that the more he accumulates, the more he must give away and therefore
the more he is at risk of alienating the followers on whom his power depends if he fails to
do so…[G]iven the constraints on thepractices constitutive of big-man roles, nomutation
or recombination could bring about and institutional change from within’.
31 Bourdieu 1990, p. 131.
32 Godelier 1972, p. 289.
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The deployment of this functioning logic assumes the absence of an aristo-
cracy (the case of Iceland is an example) or a weak social control on the part
of the aristocracy and the state over peasant populations, since the relative
autonomy of the latter is the condition of possibility of such logic. Thus, the
emergence of the peasant mode in the early Middle Ages is associated with a
historical process of impoverishment of the aristocracy and decline of the fiscal
systemwhich took place inWestern Europe between the fifth and sixth centur-
ies.
The historical conditions for the genesis of the peasant mode in Western
Europe do not imply the total dissolution of the ancient forms of property,
which correspond to various modes of labour exploitation (colonate, serfdom,
taxation) directly or indirectly enabled by the structures of the fiscal state. It is
rather a historical process of involution of the state and retrogression in the
wealth levels of the aristocrats, who lost control over their possessions and
the subjugated labour force. This process took place in different manners that
altered the morphology of the aristocracy, giving rise to two variations: (1) the
aristocracy becomes tribalised and its power is confined to leadership over free
people (and to a very limited exploitation of the unfree); or (2) it narrows its
areaof influence, preserving effective rights of exploitationonly over aminority
of the peasantry.
The first case is the ‘tribal’ variation of the peasant mode, in which the
members of the aristocracy are mostly chieftains similar to ‘big men’; in this
variation, exemplified in the proto-states of Northern Europe (England, Wales,
Ireland, Denmark), property has not morphed into the right to claim rent. The
free men owe their local leaders or their rulers military service and a small
tribute which does not affect their economic autonomy and must be repaid;
this bond becomes tangible in non-permanent clientelar relations in which
the followers preserve the right to withdraw or change their loyalties. In this
version, the aristocracy assimilates itself to the peasant mode; that is to say, it
does not constitute a separate mode of production.33
In the second case, the extraction of surplus from dependent segments
denotes the presence of relations of exploitation, and thereby of anothermode
of production thatWickham sums up in the concept of the feudalmode, which
coexists with free spaces not dominated by the aristocracy where the peasant
mode manifests itself. In this case, the independent peasants are in contact
33 Haldon observes that Wickham dismissed the difference in meaning between the terms
‘aristocracy’ and ‘elite’; he suggests that the latter termwould have beenmore appropriate
(Haldon 2011, p. 52).
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with feudal landowners with whom they maintain links that are more or less
lax or sporadic. This is the more habitual form of existence of the peasant
mode in Western Europe: integrated into a regional or micro-regional social
whole inwhich feudal enclaves also exist.34Wickham’s image of ‘leopard spots’
conveys this situation of coexistence of distinct modes of production within a
social formation. Bothmodes (feudal and peasant) articulate in different ways,
giving rise to an array of situations which basically express the pre-eminence
of one mode or the other in the society in question. In a social formation
dominated by the peasant mode, the position of the aristocracy, whose wealth
and politicial influence are limited, will depend on the support of free people,
which gives rise to practices of reciprocity, such as gift-giving, in exchange for
loyalty. The relationship between the aristocracy and the free peasantry follows
patterns similar to those observed in societies that have undergone a process of
tribalisation. Thus, the rules arising from the internal logic of the peasantmode
are rendered on the whole. The dominance of the peasant mode in the early
medieval social formations is evidenced in the archaeological record, which
generally reflects a simplified material culture.
Both forms of existence of the peasant mode (tribal or in combination with
feudal enclaves) imply the subordination of the aristocracy to the logic of the
gift, which inhibits the development of accumulation processes and constrains
wealth levels to its limits; this dynamic leads to a principle thwarting the trans-
formationof societieswhere thepeasantmode is dominant. Nevertheless, from
the point of view of the form of property, the peasant mode favours the emer-
gence of inequalities and private accumulation, which arises predictably from
the individual appropriation of the fruits of labour. Marx points to this aspect
in the Germanic type of property, which reflects an emancipation from kinship
and community, since the community exists only as a relationship between
individual proprietors; the Germanic form of individual property does not
depend onmembership in a collective entity, nor does the collective intervene
in its valorisation; the possibility of independent economic action is the source
of dissolution of egalitarianism.35 This feature of the Germanic mode has been
emphasised by Alan Macfarlane with respect to the later appearance of cap-
italist relations.36 According to Kosminsky, the peasant social differentiation
in thirteenth-century England can be explained by the previous existence of
34 Banaji 2010, p. 218, criticises this, which he refers to as ‘microregionality of modes of
production’.
35 Marx 1964, pp. 75ff., pp. 142–5 (Marx to Zasulich).
36 Macfarlane 2002.
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individual private property, which underlies the formation of feudalism and its
evolution.37 Marx notes the undermining potential of private appropriation in
his analysis of the nineteenth-century Russian agricultural commune, charac-
terised by the predominance of divided petty cultivation; this enables private
accumulation of movable goods susceptible to exchange, which stimulates
internal differentiation.38 On a similar note, Engels points out that individual
exploitation accounts for the increasing inequality within the Russian peas-
antry and leads to its disintegration,39 which was later confirmed by Lenin in
his empirical analysis of the internal structure of this community.40 The peas-
ant mode is therefore based on an individualised form of appropriation of the
conditions of production which favours the development of inequality. Thus,
two opposing evolutionary tendencies are combined in the historical process.
As Wickham points out, the transition mechanism is the accumulation of
land and the conversion of landowning peasants into tenants, which is in
accordance with the historical evolution of the Germanic mode, whose tend-
ency toward fragmentation leads to the development of feudal relations of
exploitation – and later to capitalist relations. This process, which presents dif-
ferentiated traits on a microregional level,41 begins with the strengthening of
the internal elites (tribal aristocracy) or the external ones (feudal aristocracy)
and their distancing from the obligations of reciprocity. In the habitual form
of existence of the peasant mode, whose dominance in the social formation
depends on the entity of the feudal enclaves, the proximity of these enclaves
exposes the independent peasant communities to seigneurial violence or the
development of clientelar relations with outside aristocrats which generally
involve village leaders; these bonds can lead to an enhanced social condition
for those leaders, which tends to turn rank differences into class differences,
or to the conversion of bonds of patronage into local relations of exploitation
and domination.42 The patronage of outside aristocrats would be amechanism
for the internalisation of the values of the feudal class and a factor neutral-
37 Kosminsky 1956, p. 207: ‘The deep-seated causes of peasant differentiation probably lie
as far back as the disintegration of the pre-feudal lands into the ownership of separate
families. The formation of allodial holdings, and the development of land alienation, were
bound to result in the creation of private states’.
38 Marx 1964, pp. 142–5 (Marx to Zasulich). For the complete second and third drafts, see
Marx 1989, pp. 360–70.
39 Engels 1989.
40 Lenin 1964.
41 This process varied from village to village, Wickham 2005, pp. 432–3.
42 See the case of Malling, Wickham 2005, p. 432.
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ising class struggle.43 Here it is possible to suggest a certain parallel with Meil-
lassoux’s observations on the evolution of the domestic mode of production,
which tends toward dissolution as a society of equal communities. Accord-
ing to Meillassoux, agricultural communites are vulnerable to external attack
due to their stable location, their storage of goods, the presence of scattered
producers, etc.; the need for protection leads to new organisational patterns
(military alliances, etc.) which culminate in the establishment of class power;
this domination, which is generally from outside the community, preserves the
vocabulary of kinship or the appearance of reciprocity as an ideological under-
pinning for exploitation.44 For Bourdieu, this principle is already present in
gift exchange, which tends to create asymmetrical bonds and engender rela-
tions of dependence that take the guise of moral obligations; as the hierarchies
become institutionalised, their reproduction will rest less on symbolic forms
andwill be carried out through less costly andmore evidentmeans.45 In Gode-
lier’s scheme, the stabilisation of authority marks the first stage of the process
by which social competition, which does not involve the access to the means
of production and subsistence in primitive societies, shifts from the sphere of
the distribution of products to the sphere of the distribution of factors of pro-
duction.46 In our case this shift is manifested in the expansion of tenancy.
In early medieval social formations, the advance of the relations of exploit-
ation is evidenced in the development of craft specialisation, which reflects
the demand of utilitarian goods on the part of the aristocracy in keeping with
its increased political hierarchy and wealth. Notwithstanding, in the regions
where the feudal mode of production predominated (for example, Northern
France), the peasant mode preserved a relatively independent existence.47
Considered as a whole, the process of transition to the full dominance of the
feudal mode takes place in three stages:
[F]irst, a steady strengthening of aristocratic status andwealth, inside the
constraints of the peasant mode and/or in neighbouring areas; second,
a catastrophe-flip from a peasant to a feudal economic logic; third, the
steady reduction of areas of continuing peasant autonomy inside the
overall dominance of the feudal mode.48
43 Wickham 2005, p. 440.
44 Meillassoux 1991, pp. 82–8.
45 Bourdieu 1990, pp. 122–35.
46 Godelier 1974b, pp. 34–5.
47 Wickham 2005, p. 547.
48 Wickham 2005, p. 588.
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The aim of this theoretical proposition, as stated by Wickham in the first
formulations of his concept, is to introduce ‘more firmly’ into the study of the
early Middle Ages the functioning patterns that anthropologists have estab-
lished for ‘primitive’ societies.49Other historians before himhave applied these
patterns to medieval Europe, but those patterns have not been converted into
a comprehensive concept aimed at the understanding of the whole, or they
have not been combined with the productive structure, limiting the analysis
to the sphere of circulation.50 On the other hand, the authors in the field of
anthropologywho have linked elements of the ‘archaic’ functioningwith forms
of production have based their schemes on societies where the development of
individual private property is rare or non-existent.51 From this perspective, the
concept of peasant mode constitutes an undeniable contribution which could
be considered in the framework of the analyses arising from the revision of the
Formen, this time based on the property form of the Germanic mode.
It behooves us to note that this is not the author’s view. In Framing the
Early Middle Ages, Wickham does not mention the Germanic mode nor any
other non-exploitative mode. In the author’s opinion, the categorisation of
non-exploitativemodes is unsatisfactory;52 consequently his propositionmust
also be considered an attempt in this direction growing out of the efforts at sys-
tematisation of classless societies undertaken by other authors (Sahlins, Meil-
lassoux).Wickhamwants to limit the inventory ofmodes of production to three
basic forms of labour exploitation (slave, feudal and capitalist), unifying the
ones that imply a control of the productive process by the direct producers.
With the same criterion (simplifying the categorisation of modes of produc-
tion), he suggests the addition of only one non-exploitativemode – the peasant
mode – which would reflect ‘the patterns of the peasant economy that can be
found when landlords or the state do not take surplus in a systematic way’.53
Given that the absence of relations of exploitation, as well as the extraction
of surplus through extra-economic coercion, can be found in diverse forms
of property (individual, communal), the universality of the peasant mode as
49 Wickham 1994d, p. 216.
50 For instance, Duby 1978, pp. 48–56, and Gurevich 1985, ch. 3. For further bibliography
on the gift-exchange model and its application to early medieval societies, see Moreland
2000, p. 14, n. 62.
51 For instance, Meillassoux 1991, pp. 34–9; Sahlins 1972, pp. 92–4. According to Godelier
1974c, p. 87, private ownership is an exception when it comes to pre-capitalist modes of
production.
52 Wickham 1994b, p. 45.
53 Wickham 2005, p. 261.
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the mode of agrarian societies without aristocratic domination presents the
same difficulties as the universality of the tributary mode (‘feudal’ in Wick-
ham’s terminology) as the mode of pre-capitalist class societies, a perspective
that several authors have criticised.54
In ‘The other transition’, Wickham refers to the Germanic mode (‘a defin-
able mode inside Marx’s inadequately analysed congeries of non-hierarchical
systems that he called the “primitive communism” mode’) and dismisses its
presence in the early Middle Ages based on the existence of settlements of
German peasants whom he identifies with structures ‘focused on some com-
munal property’.55 Even though Marx, influenced by Maurer’s work, hesitated
over the features of the primitive Germanic community, his analysis under-
scores the individual component, which determines its potential for trans-
formation. The degree of emancipation of the community is the criterion
against which Marx compared the different forms and analysed what determ-
ines their specificity: the individual appropriation unmediated by the com-
munity is what distinguishes the Germanic mode from the ancient and the
Asiaticmodes;56 this distinction squareswith one of themain pillars of the For-
men, namely the relationship between forms of property and the dynamism of
societies.57
The shift in his perspective with regard to private property in primitive Ger-
mania is found in the drafts of the letter to Vera Zasulich, where Marx mulls
over a period before private property around Tacitus’s time (‘agricultural com-
munity’) in which the individuals own the house, its surroundings and have
rights of possession on the arable, a formation that would later give way to
54 Banaji 2010, pp. 183–5 and 212–14; Anderson 1979, pp. 402ff.; Manzano Moreno 1998;
Astarita 1994, and 2003.
55 Wickham 1994a, pp. 29–30.
56 Marx states that ‘[i]ndividual landed property does not here appear as a contradictory
form of communal landed property, nor asmediated by the community, but the other way
round…The community is neither the substance, onwhich the individual appearsmerely
as the accident … It is rather the common element in language, blood, etc., which is the
premise of the individual proprietor; but on the other hand it has real being in its actual
assembly for communal purposes; and, in so far as it has a separate economic existence, in
the communally used hunting-grounds, pastures, etc., it is used thus by every individual
proprietor as such, and not in his capacity as a representative of the state (as in Rome)’
(Marx 1964, p. 80).
57 According to the Formen, ‘[t]he Asiatic form necessarily survives longest and most stub-
bornly. This is due to the fundamental principle on which it is based, that is, that the
individual does not become independent of the community’ (Marx 1964, p. 83).
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the private property of the arable (‘new community’).58 These hesitations have
affected the characterisation of primitiveGermania,59 but not the type of prop-
erty that Marx describes for the Formen which, in any case, following his last
reflections, would be subject to a different chronology (the ‘new community’
would have developed at some moment between Tacitus and the migrations,
and it features the free peasant still present in the Middle Ages). In conclu-
sion, the Germanic mode of the Formen represents a specific form of property,
regardless ofwhether it prevailedbefore or after Tacitus. In this respect, Dopsch
has demolished the Mark theory through the philological analysis of Tacitus’s
Germania;60 Boutruche also supports the existence of individual private prop-
erty among primitive Germans.61 Furthermore, the archaeological discovery
of parcel limits confirms, for the society in question, a structure founded on
private property as described in the Formen62 (regardless of the specific form
of settlement).
Wickham acknowledges the vitality of ‘German and non-German’ free peas-
ant communities (given their former subjection to fiscal obligations, he deems
them tobederived from the ancientmode) and their return to non-exploitative
systems in the early Middle Ages.63 These non-exploitative systems mostly
reproduce the essence of the Germanic type, because they reproduce the allo-
dial holding, the free heritable property.64 Therefore, the concept of the peas-
58 Marx 1964, pp. 142–5 (Marx to Zasulich); also Marx 1989; Engels 1970, pp. 293–306; see
Godelier 1977, pp. 83–99.
59 Anderson 1996, p. 108, considers that reallocation of arable landwas still in use in Tacitus’s
times; according to Seccombe 1995, pp. 52–3, although private ownership was not un-
known among the Germans, the extent of it depended on the development of agricultural
techniques and agrarian practices allowing for the restoration of the soil so that it could be
regularly cultivated by the same family. Boserup 1993, pp. 77–81, associates the emergence
of individual property rights with agricultural intensification.
60 Dopsch 1951, pp. 58–74.
61 For a bibliography on this, see Boutruche 1959, p. 62, n. 5.
62 García Moreno 1992.
63 Wickham 1994a, p. 30.
64 Although initially associatedwith family possession, according toBonnassie, ‘[t]ransporté
dans l’Europe du Midi par les invasions germaniques, le mot “alleu” y change totalement
de sens. Il vient s’y plaquer sur la vieille notion romaine de proprietas. Il cesse donc de
désigner ici le patrimoine lignager pour s’appliquer à la propriété individuelle, divisible
et aliénable sans aucune sorte d’entrave’ (Bonnassie 1981, p. 18). See also Bonnassie 1975,
p. 205. Gurevich 1992b, p. 204ff., highlights the persistence of the original meaning of
the óðal from which the word allodium would derive. This opinion is partially valid for
Wickham 1994c, p. 166.
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ant mode, which I would have called the ‘allodial mode of production’, does
not imply a new form of property. Instead, it develops aspects related to the
productive forces, the social relations of exchange and the laws of social func-
tioning. These aspects are not foreign to the society on which the elaboration
of the concept of Germanic mode is based, as evidenced in Tacitus’s accounts
of the low intensity of labour,65 gift exchange as a form of social bonding,66 the
instability of chieftains,67 and a differentiated nobility whose power over free
men is limited and subordinated to the logic of the whole.68
Although Wickham does not develop the problem of property from a the-
oretical standpoint, he verifies the prevalence of independent landowning
peasants in almost all the regions, and through his criticism of documents
he demonstrates the real appropriation by free peasants of the productive
resources and the product in the regions where they are referred to as tenants,
as in the case of Anglo-Saxon England. Even though from the legal perspective
one cannot assert the existence of peasant property in this case, the appro-
priation of the conditions of production and its results is not negated by the
requirement of tribute, whose marginal character the author shows in his ana-
lysis of the composition of the payments owed to the rulers, which are generally
informal contributions of hospitality; this is why he considers this land ten-
ure system as ‘tribal’, and attributes the category of ‘autonomous’ rather than
‘proprietors’ to the free peasants who inhabit the large territorial units men-
tioned in Anglo Saxon charters (which maintain the lexicon of Roman law)
as the exclusive property of lay or ecclesiastical entities.69 As for the com-
munal component (whose role is secondary in the Germanic mode of the For-
65 Tacito, Germania, 14: Nec arare terram aut exspectare annum tam facile persuaseris quam
vocare hostem et vulnera mereri. Pigrum quin immo et iners videtur sudore adquirere quod
possis sanguine parare.
66 Tacito,Germania, 15:Mosest civitatibusultroac viritimconferre principibus vel armentorum
vel frugum, quod pro honore acceptum etiam necessitatibus subvenit. Gaudent praecipue
finitimarum gentium donis, quae non modo a singulis, sed et publice mittuntur; ibid., 14:
[E]xigunt enim principis sui liberalitate illum bellatorem equum, illam cruentam victricem-
que frameam; ibid., 21: Convictibus et hospitiis non alia gens effusius indulget.
67 Tacito, Germania, 11: Deminoribus rebus principes consultant; de maioribus, omnes… Mox
rex vel princeps, prout aetas cuique, prout nobilitas, prout decus bellorum, prout facundia
est, audiuntur, auctoritate suadendi magis quam iubendi potestate.
68 Tacito, Germania, 7: Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt. Nec regibus infinita aut
libera potestas, et duces exemplo potius quam imperio, si prompti, si conspicui, si ante aciem
agant, admiratione praesunt.
69 Wickham 2005, pp. 314–26.
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men), woodland, according to Wickham, ‘for the most part it was accessible
to anyone living in the area who wished to use it’, regardless of its legal condi-
tion.70
Peasant autonomy is not attributable to a pattern of settlement. In societies
of the early Middle Ages, the settlement in isolated farms proposed by Tacitus
(and found in Iceland),71 which Marx followed in his Formen, coexists with
the grouping in villages; in turn, peasant property appears intermixed with
aristocratic patrimony. The more concentrated peoplings favour cooperation
in productive activities, and such cooperation breeds concerted action on the
part of the members of the community, which reaffirms their autonomy. Due
to the isolation of the productive units, in the Germanic mode the community
is visualised as such when the proprietors meet in an assembly. In the peasant
mode, the community is defined by the social action of its members, and it
is conditioned by the form of existence of aristocratic patrimony (the more
scattered, the better the chances of peasant protagonism). Peasant autonomy
not onlymeans that peasants caneffectively disposeof the fruits of their labour;
it also means that they are capable of action independent of the aristocracy,
which in turn implies an inverse relation between peasant autonomy and
the development of relations of patronage with magnates from outside the
community.72
Finally, by virtue of the historical conditions of its emergence, the peasant
mode (except in the paradigmatic case of Iceland and generally in the proto-
states of Northern Europe) implies a coexistence with another mode of pro-
duction, which brings the analysis to the sphere of social formation and the
practices that reflect the articulation of the different modes and the subordin-
ation of ancient social forms to the dominant mode of production. With its
stress on the logic of social functioning, Wickham’s concept can be properly
applied to the analysis of this problem.
70 Wickham 1994c, p. 188. The description of the communal elements of Malling is basically
in accordance with the communal component of the Germanic mode of the Formen:
‘Mallingwas not a legal entity, but it had a certain identity as a village. Villagers did not yet
co-operate so much in economic tems … but they did run livestock collectively, and also
together took wood from the part of the woodland 10km away that Malling had rights to
… The free men of Malling … did however go together to the local legal assembly …which
was the meeting point of a dozen villages’ (Wickham 2005, pp. 430–1).
71 Miller 1984, p. 99, n. 14. On dispersion and localisation of farms, see Callow 2006, p. 305.
72 On this point, see Knight 2011.
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Peasant-Aristocrat Patronage Links: Transmutation of the Peasant
Practice in a Feudalised Context
In the historical dynamic of the peasant mode, the development of clientelar
links is a mechanism for the construction of power that goes hand in hand
with the advance of feudal relations of exploitation. We will analyse a type
of clientelar relation characteristic of Castile and León during the eleventh
and twelfth centuries, which is also present in Galicia and Portugal, with the
aim of establishing what this bond consists of and how we can document
the transition to exploitative forms. In social formations dominated by the
peasantmode, the aristocracy is subordinated to the logic of reciprocity; in our
case, we will start from a social formation dominated by the feudal mode –
a classic leopard-spot area, where the aristocracy coexists with autonomous
peasants – and we will observe how this dominance subordinates surviving
peasant practice by infusing it with new content. We will take up the criterion
established by Meillassoux, Godelier and Bourdieu regarding the preservation
of the appearance of reciprocity as amechanismof justificationor construction
of relations of exploitation, and we will propose that this process undergoes
intermediate stages where an ambivalence and gradual reformulation of the
social practice can be observed.73
The clientelar bond we will analyse is manifested in a series of social prac-
tices: land endowment in exchange formilitary service, mediation and defense
in judicial courts, fosterage, election of lords and hospitality. In peasant soci-
eties these practices reflect social relations based on the exchange of gifts; in
the feudalised contextwe are analysing, however, these practices, though form-
ally analogous, tend to place themselves at the service of the reproduction of
the feudal class. The slow pace and the forms of this process conveying the
expansion of feudalism are explained by the logic of the peasant mode, whose
principles, even while undergoing a process of disintegration, still condition
the behaviour of the aristocracy. The subordination of peasant practice hap-
pens in two stages:
(1) During the eleventh century, clientelar links in the area of Castile and León
reflect an incomplete dominance of the feudal mode of production: the per-
sons involved in these relationships (village notables, free peasants, humble
knights) preserve a certain degree of autonomy and provide non-agrarian ser-
vices except in the case of the servants and the unfree, with whom the aristo-
73 For an earlier period, see Astarita 2003–6, and 2011, p. 212.
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cracy maintains ambivalent links. Clientelar relations are relatively unstable,
although the ability to change loyalties tends to be reduced to a formulaic state-
ment. Notwithstanding, this formulaic statement is used to express the client’s
condition as a free person or the promotion of the unfree, which indicates that
non-aristocratic segments are still afforded a certain amount of protagonism;
this circumstance is also manifested in the granting of lands in exchange for
military support.
(2) In the early twelfth century, the process of subordination of autonom-
ous peasants and their social forms has been accomplished: we witness the
spread of collective links and the transformation of the service provided by cli-
ents into agrarian rent, as well as a crystallisation of the separation between
milites and farm labourers by which the former are exempt from taxation and
restrictions with regard to their political allegiance and are therefore able to
join the feudal system as vassals, and the latter remain subjected to seigneur-
ial lineages and taxation, that is to say, excluded from the category of free
people from the point of view of their political capabilities and their abil-
ity to dispose of the fruits of labour. The transformation of clients into ten-
ants is clearly visible from the early eleventh century in some pacts of the
Galician-Portuguese area implying the loss of economic autonomy on the part
of the clients, which reflects an earlier establishment of feudalism in that
region.
The analysis of the bond between patrons and clients yields elements inher-
ent to peasant practice that can promote this evolution. The change is also
favoured by the structure of property which facilitates its transmission and
disposition. This aspect has been highlighted by Reyna Pastor, who attributes
seigneurial advance over village communities to the consolidation in the lat-
ter of individual property since the tenth century, within the framework of a
system of property consistent with the Germanic form (combination of private
and communal property, emancipationof the individual from the community);
as stressed by Pierre Guichard, the disposition of individual property favours
disposession and the fall into dependency, an evolution that is not observed
in societies where the communal framework prevails, such as some Islamic
societies.74 In this regard, Miquel Barceló has analysed the stability of clan set-
tlements in al-Andalus, and he believes this stability to be associated with the
impossibility of trading in land, which hampers the formation of a feudal class
74 Pastor 1984. Pierre Guichard’s comments appear in Pastor 1984, p. 116.
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through absorption of patrimony.75 Thus, this latter phenomenon encounters
more favourable conditions in places with a predominance of communities
emancipated from kinship.
What follows is an analysis of the transformation of clientelar bonds and
their structural foundations stemming from the social functioning of the peas-
ant mode. We will examine how the opposing evolutionary tendencies typical
of this system combine (peasant dispossession/limitation of accumulation).
Gifts of Lands to Peasants
One of the features of the bond between patron and client is the granting of
lands in exchange for services. Land endowments on the part of the patron
abound in the eleventh-century records. They are charters of donation or sale
which refer to the recipient’s ability to choose a lord.76 In almost every case,
members of comital families cede land in order to obtain, maintain or repay
a service, mainly military service, as can be deduced from the fact that the
clients give or promise to give swords and horses in exchange for the gift.77 The
meaning of thephrase bene facere as a synonymof land endowment formilitary
service can be traced to tenth-century lawswhich exempt frommilitary service
those knights who have not been granted material means of support, ordering
them to seek a lord that will grant them.78
The endowments can be temporary, for life or hereditary. They are more
likely loans of land subject to the duration of the bond. Notwithstanding, in
some documents the ceded lands are equated with allodial holdings, which
on principle is consistent with the form of property of the peasant mode: the
recipients can donate the land, sell it, bequeath it, etc.79 The grants include
75 Barceló 1990, pp. 105ff. Guichard 1984, p. 131, has observed the existence of collective
forms of appropriation and North African kinship structures that hamper land transfers
in al-Andalus.
76 Ut vadas ad qualemdominum volueris, pergas cum ipso solare ad qualemcumque dominum
volueris, qui tibi bene fecerit, etc. Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, and 1988b; Fernández Flórez
1991; Ruiz Asencio 1987, and 1990.
77 For instance, Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 826 (1086): Ego Beliti Citiz a uobis Martino
Flayniz, domino meo, dauo uobis una espata ualente xx solidos de argento.
78 Muñoz yRomero 1847, p. 38, FuerodeCastrojeriz (974):Caballerode castro, quinon tenuerit
prestamo, non vadat in fonsado, nisi dederint ei espensam, et sarcano illoMerino et habeant
segniorem, qui benefecerit illos.
79 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 566 (1054): Aveas, vindeas, dones, commutes tu et filiis
tuis quo tivi queris; doc. 702 (1071): abeasque licentiam facendi ex eo quod tua extiterit
uoluntas; Fernández Flórez 1991, doc. 1252 (1133): et faciatis ex eo quicquid extiterit uestra
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the right to communal land as an accessory of the individual plot, precisely
as found in the Germanic form.80 A couple of cases note the client’s prior
condition as private proprietor: one of the recipients has previously sold some
pieces of land acquired through purchase which are free and clear of any
obligation.81 Another case confirms the sale of lands that had been acquired
as payment for non-agrarian service.82
It has been suggested that the terminology related to full ownership ( faciatis
ex eo quicquid exiterit uestra uoluntas, etc.) could reflect the constitution of a
bond, which even if disposition of the property is possible, implies an obliga-
tion for the recipient.83 As William Ian Miller observes in his study of family
sagas, gifts of lands were avoided or feared in view of the implied relation of
subordination to the giver derived from the fact that the debt could only be
settled with another grant of lands.84 The spread of this practice in eleventh-
century Castile and León reflects the construction of power by means of gifts
that can only be repaid with services, as well as the denaturation of allodial
holdings, which tend to become tenancies subject to rent or conditioned prop-
erty; thepreservationof the lexiconof full ownership could result fromtheneed
to acknowledge the free condition of the land recipients, whom the lawequates
to (but does not confuse with) the aristocracy.85
In fact these procedures emulate the transactions between members of the
aristocracy in which the gifts of lands are reciprocated with symbolic presents:
the patrons receive horses, greyhounds, swords or mules from their clients as
uoluntas, uendere, donare; et habeatis ipsum solare confirmatum, uos et omnis posteritas
uestra; doc. 1189 (1113): et quicquid tibi de illa placuerit facere, facias: uendere, dare, tua
uoluntate complere, in uita siue post mortem, tu et ex omni progenie tua.
80 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 634 (1063): Facium tiui kartula de uno solare cum sua erea
et cum suo orto et cum suo exitum ab intro et at foras.
81 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 624 (1063) and doc. 578 (1056): Ut uinderem uobis ego
Gundisaluo presbiter et germana mea Geluira una corte de mea comparacione … ut de
isto die de iuri nostro abstracto uestro sit tradito et faciatis de eo quod uestra extiterit
uoluntas.
82 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 1086 (1102): Et habui ego Citi Albariz ipso solare de
incartacione de comite Pedro Ansuriz et de sua mulier, propter filios eorum que ego nutriui
… Facio tibi carta per tale foro quomodo ille comes michi fecit et vadas cum eo ubi volueris,
tu et filius tuus et omnis progenie tua.
83 Morsel 2008, p. 207.
84 Miller 1986, pp. 49ff.
85 Pérez Prendez y Muñoz de Arraco 1988, Fuero de León (o), tit. x: Praecipimus etiam ut
nullus nobilis sive aliquis de benefactoria emat solare aut ortum alicuius junioris.
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counter-gifts.86 The transfer of horses in exchange for protection and means
of subsistence shows up in Laxdæla saga; Miller highlights the subordination
of the economic content of the transaction, which is presented as a sale, to
the social relationship established between the parties which precludes the
disassociation of the goods from their bearers; he who acquires horses also
acquires obligations toward their prior owner and his family, to whomhe cedes
lands.87 In our case the clients probably did not part from the objects they
offered as a symbolic closing of the transaction, since they used them to serve
their patron and the objects symbolised that service. Their condition as knights
was precarious: in a will dated between 1085 and 1115, the patron awards his
client some land and the horse the latter was using, which shows that many
knights did not own their horses, and that clients were provided with the
equipment for military service.88 In a covenant of 1073, the client is given land
and a colt;89 in another case, along with the land, the client receives a horse,
a mule, three oxen, 22 sheep and seven pigs.90 These goods are described as
components of theproductiveunit,whichpermits an estimationof the amount
of means of production at stake, equivalent to a domestic unit of modest
proportions. It follows fromthis that our client is apeasantwho is being granted
basicmeansof subsistence and the essentials ofmilitary equipmentwithwhich
he will be able to lend his support to various members of the aristocracy.91
The need to secure loyalties among the peasantry shows that the devel-
opment of feudalism was incomplete in the area. Competition among lords
is evidenced in material endowments aimed at gaining supporters. In 1063,
Juliana Muñiz grants lands to Sesgudo Escámez in the locality of Santa Cruz;
Sesgudo reciprocates with a horse.92 The following year, Juliana rewards Ses-
gudo once more for his good service with a plot of land in another location,93
86 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 634 (1063), 638 (1064), 702 (1071), 713 (1072), 719 (1073), 720
(1073); Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 826 (1086), 887 (1092), 795 (1081); Fernández Flórez
1991, doc. 1198 (1117).
87 Miller 1986, p. 48; Laxdæla saga, ch. 36.
88 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 1173 (1085–1115): Et tibi, MartinoMunniz, dono uno solare,
ubi tu volueris; et illum cauallum quem tenes de me, habeas solutum pro mea anima; per-
gasque cum ipso solare ad qualemcumque dominum uolueris.
89 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 721 (1073).
90 Ruiz Asencio 1990, doc. 1233 (1084).
91 Ruiz Asencio 1990, doc. 1233 (1084): cum tale foro de mare ad mare, ad rei, ad conde, ad
infancone, ad quale dono uoleris in ipso solare sedente medio die et media ora.
92 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 634 (1063).
93 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 683 (1064).
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which shows that Sesgudo’s loyalty had to be renewed, and that land grants did
not guarantee the sustained support of the clients. As for the clients, in some
cases they appear as serving different patrons simultaneously: for example,
in 1073 Rodrigo Miguélez is awarded lands belonging to Armentario Vélez; in
exchange he offers a grey horse;94 during the same year he receives another
piece of land in the same village from Pedro Vermúdez and in full ownership,
this time in exchange for a roan horse and a greyhound.95 The dimensions of
these properties (the amount that can be tilled with two oxen) correspond to
a family holding,96 which places our client among the peasantry of the village.
At this level wewitness competition in order to recruit supporters through gifts
of lands, whichmust be equivalent to those of other lords in the same location;
such is the case of Elvira, who in 1071 grants a client a piece of land in Santa
Cruz ‘of the same size as that of Sesgudo’ (who had received lands from Juli-
anaMuñiz).97 The example also illustrates the coexistence of a variety of bonds
within the same village, which in turn reflects peasant protagonism.
The individuals who take part in these relationships could resemble the
milites of peasant origin detected by Bonnassie in eleventh-century Catalonia,
less submissive villagers who served various lords at the same time without
taking on relevant obligations with any of them and without becoming fully
integrated into the system of feudal vassalage: the author distinguishes them
from the milites castri committed to the defence of fortresses who would end
up incorporated into the ranks of the aristocracy.98 Historians have recognised
the material endowments for a client’s military service as a precedent of bene-
ficial concessions99 and they have also observed the direct transformation of
clientelar bonds into feudo-vassalic relationships;100 the incorporation of rural
segments to the seigneurial armed retinue has been related to the reorganisa-
tion and adaptation of the aristocracy to the structural requirements of banal
lordship.101 In some cases, the relationship of benefactoria could be inscribed
94 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 719 (1073).
95 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 720 (1073): Ut de isto die habeas licenciam faciendi de ipso
solare et de ipsa hereditate quod tua extiterit uoluntas.
96 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 720 (1073): cum suas terras, ut habeat uno iugo de boves ad
duas folias in aratura quod laborent.
97 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 702 (1071):Ut uinderemus tibi Steuano Ciluanez uno solare
similiter tamanio quomodo est ille de Sesguto Examiz.
98 Bonnassie 1975, ii, pp. 800ff.
99 Dopsch 1951, pp. 386ff.; White 2003, p. 98.
100 Morsel 2008, p. 68.
101 Morsel 2008, pp. 149–50.
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in this process of reformulation and expansion of the aristocracy involving the
transformation of clients into vassals, which illustrates one of the avenues for
the disintegration of peasant societies through the social promotion of their
leaders; on the other hand, we will observe that the relatively undifferentiated
group of clients tends to become split intomilites and farm labourers over the
course of the century; the former will likely become integrated into féodalité,
whereas the latter become subject to feudal relations of exploitation.
Conflict Mediation and the Performance of Patrons in the Assembly
Patrons acted as conflict mediators and advocates for their clients in courts.
These functions have been well documented in Galicia and Portugal. Let us
review an example. In 1008, two siblings, Adosinda and Argerigo, sell a piece
of land to the local priest in exchange for livestock and food. The reason
for the transaction is that the priest has helped them by acting as mediator
before Adosinda’s husband, whom she has betrayed, and perhaps he also acted
on their behalf before the higher authority to whom a fine for adultery is
due, which the siblings apparently have only partially paid. The priest inter-
cedes with Adosinda’s husband on her behalf, he gathers representatives from
both families in his own house, he counsels them and manages to recon-
cile the parties. This performance is the essence of the covenant of ‘bemfei-
toria’.102
Conflict resolution is themainmanifestation of functional power in peasant
mode societies.103 Success in lawsuits depends to a large extent on the support
marshalled for one cause, that is to say, on the number of men the leader can
bring to the assembly in support of his suit, which is in direct relation with
his reputation as a successful jurist. The role of local leaders as advocates,
mediators and peacemakers has been highlighted by scholars of the Icelandic
sagas.104 The mediator’s mission is to reconcile the parties in a manner that is
102 Portugaliae Monumenta Historica. Diplomata et chartae, ccii (1008), p. 124: Quanto inde
tenemus innostro iureqummaternostragoda…nos tivi inde rovoramusmedietate integra…
Et dedisti nobis adduc in pretio ii boves et iii modios de zivario et iias cabras et uno carnario
tanto nobis bene complacuit … Et damus tibi ea pro occasione que abenit ad ipsa adosinda
et in suo peccato devenit a tradictione et abuit prome a dare cl solidos et dedit inde illos l ad
uilifonso mumdinizi… Et favolastis pro me ad meo marito virterla et dimisit mici illa merze
et rezebit me pro sua muliere et consudunasti nos todos tres in tua kasa ad tua bemfeitoria.
103 Wickham 2005, pp. 431–2, the advocacy for neighbours in court is the main role of
Eahlmund and Ælfwine, Malling leaders. The reconstruction of Malling is based on the
case of medieval Iceland.
104 Miller 1990, pp. 259–99, and 1984; Byock 2001, pp. 66ff.
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either complementary or an alternative to the judicial resolution of the case. As
Bourdieu remarks, representation in courts and conflict mediation are typical
forms of accumulation of symbolic capital.105
An episode of Eyrbyggja saga highlights one aspect of the intervention of
third parties in disputes between households: land grants as repayment for
representation services in courts. In this case the litigants do not wish to
reconcile, but to win the case in the assembly.106 Thorolf and Ulfar are feuding
neighbours. Thorolf ’s son Arnkel, who is a renowned goði, always tries to
compensate Ulfar for his father’s hostile actions. Thorolf dispatches slaves to
set fire to Ulfar’s house; Arnkel seeks them out and kills them. Ulfar transfers
his property toArnkel (who favours his leadershipover his kinship) in exchange
for his protection. Thorolf demands compensation for his dead slaves; Arnkel
refuses to pay it; Thorolf decides to bring his case to the courts, which requires
that he find a specialist as renowned as Arnkel or even more so. Since Arnkel
is one of the goðar of the district, Thorolf should appeal to Arnkel, but Thorolf
makes use of his liberties to change allegiance and appeals to Snorri goði for
him to present the case before the assembly. At first Snorri refuses, because the
case is unpopular, but Thorolf secureshis support byofferinghim lands. Thorolf
transfers the lands but retains the usufruct; upon his death they will become
Snorri’s outright property.107 There is rivalry between Snorri and Arnkel; Snorri
has taken advantage of the opportunity to see Arnkel disinherited. Thorolf ’s
interest in the matter, as Miller suggests, is not material, since the value of
the land exceeds the compensation he could obtain for the slaves; by winning
the case in the assembly, which is what he expects to do by means of Snorri’s
abilities, Thorolf enhances his reputation and reconstructs alliances predicated
from his bond with a renowned chieftain. The gift of lands has served him to
disinherit his son, fromwhomhe is estranged, to intervene in adisputebetween
two chieftains competing to gain supporters, and to consolidate his own status
through the success of his case in the assembly.
This example could illuminate some aspects of the clientelar relationship
that concern us. In the adultery case reviewed above, the gift of land to the
priest who brokered the reconciliation between both families does not appear
disproportionate if one considers that the woman who cedes the land could
105 Bourdieu 1990, pp. 128–9.
106 Eyrbyggja saga, ch. 31. This episode has been analysed byMiller 1984, pp. 126–32, and 1990,
pp. 289–94; Byock 1982, pp. 152–4, and 2001, pp. 99–117.
107 On the transfer of land in medieval Iceland, see Miller 1984, p. 126, n. 123, and 1986, p. 47,
n. 106.
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have been rejected by her husband and lost all chances of remarrying, which
would have put her family, represented by her brother, in a grave predicament.
In these circumstances, the siblings’ bond with a prominent local character
such as the priest is for them more valuable than the land, since it implies a
certain position within the community and avoids a conflict between families.
Just as in Eyrbyggja saga, the granting of lands –which is reciprocatedwith live-
stock and food – builds a social relationship which does not imply economic
exploitation (there is no mention of tributes) but a political alliance between
free people, evenwhen the transaction contributes to the accrual of patrimony
for one of the parties involved. It follows that this latter phenomenon, which in
a general sense accompanies the expansion of feudal relations of exploitation,
is rooted in precedents reflecting the social functioning of the peasant mode
(the granting of land in return for mediation services), and whose condition
of possibility is a property structure that objectively favours these transactions
(the existence of individual private property). Byock characterises the property
structure in Iceland as ‘a systemof allodial-type landownership’ which protects
the rights of the heirs, although the alienation of the property is eventually
subject to the wishes or the weakness of the proprietors. Drawing from the
episode of Eyrbyggja saga (mainly the transfer of lands from Ulfar to Arnkel)
and other examples, Byock suggests that the intervention in conflicts is a tactic
for the acquisition of land on the part of the chieftains, and that they resort to
it depending on the balance of power they envision having if familial claims
eventually arise.108 The author offers examples in which thingmenn in trouble
transfer lands to their chieftains in order to obtain protection or representation
in court.109 Thus, the potential for dissolution derived from the property form
of the peasant mode is expressed in social practices rooted in status disputes,
which in turnmay suggest the existence of principles of change inherent to the
logic of how peasant societies work.
The evolution of this tendency can be observed in some benefactoria cov-
enants arising from the need of mediation or representation which lead to the
loss of economic autonomy for the clients. These are agreements struck after
a crime has been commmitted, which summon the patrons to one of the typ-
ical functions of political leaders in peasant mode societies: to help in court
cases in which their clients are involved. (This phenomenon could derive from
the relative prevalence of a primitive conception of honour, which explains the
108 Byock 1982, pp. 148ff.
109 Byock 2001, pp. 275–81. Payments to chieftains during the support-gathering process were
common practice; see Miller 1990, p. 242; also Njal’s saga, ch. 49, 134, 138.
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frequency of homicide among peasants and the resulting need for support in
courts of law.)110 In 1022, Gontoi and his wife cede half of their property to an
individual linked to the monastery of Celanova in exchange for his help in a
situation involving one of the couple’s sons, who has committed adultery. Gon-
toi and his wife want to avoid the consequences of a lawsuit, and if things were
to reach that instance, they want support in court; the document highlights
this function of the patron: abeamus de vobis defensionem et moderationem et
in verbo et in facto et in concilio et in benefactoria.111
The ability to convince and persuade with words, which is put to the test
in the assembly, distinguishes the leaders in peasant societies and is one of the
foundations of their authority. This attribute is associatedwith the figure of the
patron in the cases quoted and originally it may have constituted one of the
determining factors for the election of the lord. In the case of the priest who
intervenes in a dispute between families, the capacity for persuasion is key to
his performance (et favolastis pro me); in the other case, instead, the allusion
to rhetorical abilities and performance in the assembly (defensionem in verbo
… et in concilio) seems to be a formulaic statement attached to the mention
of the patron rather than an indication of his specific qualities, which reflects
the subordination of the social practice to other contents, or their formal
preservation, a prerequisite of their mutation; by acting as mediator (abeamus
de vobis moderationem) the patron obtains the right to the appropriation of
surpluses.112
In another case dating to 1012, a certain Daildo is accused of abduction by
the king’s local agents, count Rodrigo Ordóñez and the father of the victim.113
Aloiti, the former abbot of Celanova, who has since been transferred to another
monastery, shows up at the venue to pay the fine for abduction, perhaps
because he had acted as Daildo’s patron in prior occasions; in repayment,
Daildo offers him two pieces of land, only one of which really belongs to him;
the ruse is uncovered and Daildo is accused of calumny and ordered to cede
twomore pieces of land in replacement of the false one. After the intervention
of some men (who, strictly speaking, fulfil the function of mediation), Aloiti
takes pity on the man and forgives him with theatrical flair, which means
110 On the persistence of the feud culture, see Hyams 2001.
111 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 547 (1022).
112 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 547 (1022): Et demus vobis per annis singulis ad area et at
lagare medietate tam de pane et bibere quam etiam et de omnes fruges quod Dominus in
ipsa villa dedit, medium vobis demus et medium remaneat pro nobis.
113 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 572 (1012).
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Daildo ends up losing two properties instead of three.114 The speech of the
one who chairs the assembly, addressed to Aloiti the patron, demonstrates
that in this case conflict mediation is perceived as an instrument of social
disciplining: Venistis ad ipsummonasteriumad corregendum, ad salvandum, ad
moderandum, ad benefaciendum ad oves Dei que iam disperse erant. Daildo will
carry on cultivating both pieces of land and will give one third of the product
to the monastery of Celanova.115
In contrast to the first case (the one of the local priest who manages to
reconcile two families), in the two latter cases the assignees remain commit-
ted to rent payments, which indicates that the clientelar relationship no longer
expresses an alliance between free people but the slip into dependency of one
of the parties. Furthermore, while in the first case the patron mediated in a
conflict between families, in the two latter ones the mediation is aimed at mit-
igating the effects of the administration of justice on the accused, which go
beyond the settlement of the issue with a fine. This motivation, which arises
when justice becomes a source of income and an instrument of subordina-
tion,116 contributes to the spread of the practice of ceding lands to the medi-
ators. This tendency illustrates the degradation of the peasant practice in a
feudalised context: the gift of lands to compensate the service of prominent
jurists, a tool for status negotiation in peasant societies, becomes in the new
framework a regular mechanism for the absorption of property and the expan-
sion of feudal relations of exploitation albeit preserving the appearance of the
primitive practice, according to which the patrons are presented as capable
figures able to successfully steer a cause in the assembly or negotiate an agree-
ment.
The development of relations of exploitation in the area is also manifes-
ted in the dispute between fractions of the dominant class over those who
have not yet been incorporated into the feudal system: the patrons attempt
to protect their free clients from the seigneurial advance of rival powers. In
114 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 572 (1012): Et dum talia vidimus et aures audivimus et non
habuimus unde omnia ipsa villa componere per lege, fabulauimus ad homines idoneos qui
fabularunt vobis ad misericordia et pro vestra mercede vidistis et intellexistis lacrimis et
suspiriis vestris et posuistis aurem ad audiendum, et cor ad intelligendum et dimistis nobis
ipsam calumniam de ipsam villam quod abebamus ad duplare.
115 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 572 (1012): ut demus vobis pannis singulis ad area et at lagare
tercia integra, tam de pane quam de bibere.
116 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 572 (1012): et eiecistis nos de illorum manuum et de sua liga-
mine. On landownership formation through the exercise of justice see Sánchez Albornoz
1978, ch. 2, and Astarita 2007b, pp. 116 ff.
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the following example we will examine the patron’s actions in the assembly
and outside of it as a result of a crime committed by one of his clients. The
case is a homicide involving a client of count Sancho and the monastery of
Celanova.117 Tedón, a maullatus of count Sancho, has killed a man from the
monastery of Celanova with his lance, for which he is chained and jailed.
His wife offers a piece of land as bail and manages to have Tedón’s chains
removed until his situation is resolved. Once free, Tedón begins to whip up
support: he turns to his patron, count Sancho, and tells him his own version
of the events, according to which he has been wrongly accused. Infuriated by
Tedon’s account, the count sends a man to demand an explanation from the
abbot;118 the abbot maintains that Tedón is guilty and the envoy maintains
his innocence, so the case is brought to the assembly, where the count, who
chairs it, argues with the men of the monastery of Celanova and attempts to
defend his client.119 As a last recourse, the count decides to submit the case
to arbitration, so that he can be exonerated; five persons give testimony, after
which they proceed to the ordeal of hot water. This turns out a result favour-
able to the monastery of Celanova, which suggests that Tedón did not have the
support of his own community.120 Tedón and his wife leave the assembly in
anguish, perhaps because they expected a different outcome as the count was
their ally; in compensation for the homicide they have to cede one piece of
land.121
The example illustrates the context surrounding the action of mediators,
where the administration of justice is a mechanism for the accumulation of
patrimony on the part of the accusers, which in this case is not in step with
117 Andrade Cernadas 1995, pp. 656–8, doc. 474 (1056). Sánchez Albornoz 1976a, pp. 89–90,
has referred to this document, which in his opinion shows patron obligations in a relation
of benefactoria.
118 AndradeCernadas 1995, doc. 474 (1056): Ille comite taliaaudiente causanon fuit illi placibile,
sed exarsit nimis in forore et ira pro suo mallato, que absque veritate iudicaverant et tanta
mala sustinuerat. Tunc suscitavit homine bono nomine Sandino … et direxit ad ille abba pro
qua causa talia egisset.
119 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 474 (1056): baraliaverunt de ista actio non modica sed multa
causa.
120 For this understanding of the trial by ordeal, see Moore 1987, ch. 4.
121 Andrade Cernadas 1995, doc. 474 (1056): Illos vero non habuerunt unde ista omnia adim-
plere, sed molestia detemti tulerunt se de concilio. At ubi iudex vidit talia prosequentes et
ad concilio nullatenus venientes mandavit suo saione ut adsignasset ad ille abba et ad suos
fratres hereditate de Mortaria sicut et fecit. Et teneant ea usque reddat ipse Tetone et sua
mulier ipso omicidio sicut veritas docet. The land cession to the monastery of Celanova in
doc. 475.
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the patron’s sectoral interest. Quite to the contrary, the count does not wish his
client, a free proprietor, to become subjected to a feudal contender, which is
why he defends him before the assembly, recreating the political performance
of primitive chieftains. Even though the count’s intervention does not solve
Tedon’s predicament in view of the fact that Tedón has to cede a piece of
land to the monastery of Celanova, the clientelar bond preserves the forms
of peasant practice. The context, however, alters its essential content, since it
shifts the patron’s action from the sphere of status negotiation to the sphere
of competition between fractions of the feudal class and puts at stake the
economic autonomy of the client, who loses his condition of proprietor.
In one of the charters of Sahagún, the administration of justice in the locality
is a requisite for being elected lord,122 which indicates that the patron’s inter-
vention in his clients’ disputes is still a typical practice, however much that
practice, as we have observed in other areas, is now oriented to the absorption
of properties or the defence of the clientelar base when the one absorbing the
properties is a rival power. In turn, the obligation to accompany the patron to
the assembly (one of the contents of the goðar-bœndr relationship) may have
been a part of the service that clients had to render. This was an obligation for
milites living in land that was not their own, who had to attend the assembly
that the landowner attended.123 There is some evidence of client attendance
to assemblies: they show up as witnesses a short time after committing to a
patron.124 These sources point to the fact that the clients, whomwe have iden-
tified as peasants, have not yet been totally removed from public courts, which
confirms the dual character of the society in question.
122 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 549 (1051): uadat cum illo a quibus voluerit de heredes mei
qui in ipsam villam iussionem habuerint.
123 Pérez Prendes y Muñoz de Arraco 1988, Fuero de León (o), xxvi: Si vero miles in Legione
in solo alterius casam habuerit, bis in anno eat cum domino soli ad iunctam … et habeat
dominum qualemcumque voluerit.
124 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 549, 635; Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 826, 836,
887, 985, 818, 851, 1015 and 1031. Citi Pérez appears as a client in 1051 (doc. 549) and as a
confirmer in 1063 (doc. 635); Velite Cítiz receives lands in 1086 (doc. 826) and appears in
the witness-list one year later (doc. 836); Vela Velázquez acts as a confirmer (doc. 887)
three years after receiving lands (doc. 985); Pedro Iústiz accepts lands in 1085 (doc. 818)
and appears as a confirmer four years later (doc. 851); after litigationwith the abbey, Pedro
Cítiz agrees in court his condition of homine de benefactoria (doc. 1015); he appears as a
confirmer the year after (doc. 1031).
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Fosterage
In many cases, the covenants of benefactoria formalise fosterage bonds. They
involve mostly clients bringing up the children of their patrons, a service for
which the patron grants them lands, but we can also attest to bonds in the
inverse direction; it can be stated broadly that both clients and patrons acted
as fosterers.125
The Icelandic sagas offer numerous examples of the fosterage bond, which
often seals agreements between families, matrimonial alliances or proposals
for reconciliation. Hoskuld, one of the central characters of Njal’s saga, has
been brought up by Njal after his father Thrain was murdered by Skarp-Hedin,
Njal’s son (we will later address the motives of this murder).126 After paying
compensation for Thrain’s death, Njal gifts Hoskuld with a ring and offers to
take him home. Njal, a prominent Icelandic jurist, takes care of Hoskuld’s edu-
cation until he becomes a goði. In this case, the practice of fosterage comple-
ments the wergeld and consolidates the reconciliation of the families.
The fosterage bond, as opposed to adoption or profiliatio, does not imply
heredity rights for the foster-children, although they are frequently endowed
with lands; Njal buys lands for Hoskuld to settle in when he gets married.
Notwithstanding, although foster-children do not enjoy the same privileges
as biological children, they share with them the commitment to uphold the
honour of the family that has raised them, which generally implies committing
to blood vengeance.127 In Hoskuld’s case, the opportunity to act to redress his
foster family’s dishonour presents itself with the murder of Njal’s natural son.
Skarp-Hedin cannot conceive of a solution other than direct vengeance and he
murders two of the participants, but a third one who manages to escape sues
for reconciliation and obtains it through the intermediation of Hoskuld, who is
by now the most renowned goði in the district. Skarp-Hedin will never forgive
Hoskuld for having interceded in favour of an enemy of the family: this bad
blood is behind the events that some time later lead to Skarp-Hedin’s murder
of the peaceful Hoskuld. Even though Hoskuld’s death, unlike other deaths, is
presented in the saga as a tragic event, it still reflects the social functioning:
Hoskuld has failed to fulfil his duty toward the family that raised him.
Njal’s saga also provides examples of members of high-ranking families
being fostered by servants. Skarp-Hedin has been brought up by Thord, the son
125 Multi eorum erant nutricii et alumpni militum… et nutriebant filios et filias eorum, cited by
Alfonso 2002, p. 250.
126 Njal’s saga, ch. 94.
127 Rose 1926. For references on fosterage in a variety of primitive societies, see Parkes 2003,
pp. 741–82.
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of a freedman. Thord becomes involved in one of Skarp-Hedin’s disputes.When
Thord’s assassins (accompanied by Thrain, Hoskuld’s father, who observes the
scene) ambush him, they allude to the warlike qualities that Thord has passed
on to Skarp-Hedin. Thord replies that those qualities will be put to the test
because Skarp-Hedinwill repay the gift he receivedby avenging the death of his
foster-father.128 In the dialogue between Thord and his assassins lies implicit
the substance of gift-exchange according toMauss, forwhom the spiritual force
attributed to the gift drives its return to the giver.129 This is also implied in
Hoskuld’s acceptance of the ring and Njal’s protection as gestures of the same
nature; Hoskuld does not properly return the gift he accepted and therein
lies the cause of his death. In the case of Skarp-Hedin and his foster-father
Thord, even thoughThord is a servant, his death causes Skarp-Hedin to become
personally implicated, and despite having obtained compensation he fulfils
the blood vengeance by slaying all the participants (including Thrain, whom
he murders twenty years later);130 thus, Skarp-Hedin upholds the rules of his
society. The importance of Thord’s death in the saga’s narrative structure is a
testimony to the hierarchy of the fosterage bond in peasant mode societies.
From the perspective of social competition, a principle of social imbalance
is implicit in the circulation of individuals among households.131 The foster-
age bond of non-related persons is considered as a form of clientelar alliance
between families of different rank, and a key political tool in the struggle
between rival factions and clans.132 Inmedieval Ireland, the delivery of children
to subordinates is complemented with gifts of lands, in exchange for which
the givers obtain the clients’ political allegiance, military services and hospit-
ality.133
128 Njal’s saga, ch. 42:
Sigmund said to him, ‘Give yourself up, for now it is time for you to die’.
‘Certainly not’, said Thord. ‘Come and fight me in single combat’.
‘Certainly not’, said Sigmund. ‘We shall make use of our advantage in numbers. It’s not
surprising that Skarp-Hedin is so formidable, since the saying goes that one-fourth comes
from the foster-father’.
‘You shall see the full force of that’, said Thord, ‘for Skarp-Hedin will avenge me’.
129 Mauss 1954, pp. 61–2. For criticisms, see Godelier 1999; Sahlins 1972, ch. 4; Wagner-Hasel
2003, among others.Mauss’s explanation is valid forGurevich 1985, ch. 2; see alsoGurevich
1992a.
130 Njal’s saga, ch. 92.
131 Miller 1990, pp. 122–4 and 171–4; Gurevich 1992a, pp. 187–8.
132 Parkes 2003, pp. 753ff.
133 Parkes 2006, pp. 363.
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The upbringing of the children of patrons is a characteristic practice of the
benefactoria relationship. In 1102 an individual sells a piece of land he had
obtained from count Pedro Ansúrez in compensation for having fostered his
children.134 Some authors have suggested that in this example the fosterage
bond can be understood within the frame of vassalage, which would include
the military instruction of the lord’s children by his vassals.135 However, as we
shall explain, these are differentiated bonds involving distinct social segments.
In 1064, countess Mumadonna cedes lands to Velite Álvarez, a family ser-
vant, so that he may cultivate them.136 Velite reciprocates the gift with a horse,
a greyhound and a hound, suggesting that despite being a servant he holds
a special position, which could be explained by the fact that he has fostered
Mumadonna’s son, count PedroMuñoz. Four years later the count initiates pro-
ceedings to endow Velite with lands: he requests lands from Alfonso vi, a fact
that could suggest a relative patrimonial weakness of the comital aristocracy
while also demonstrating the importance they attributed to clientelar bonds,
which comprised land donations for their servants. Alfonso vi gives the count,
whom he calls fideli meo, the lands he had requested for Velite, amo tuo in the
words of the king.137 This indicates that the counthasusedhis bondof vassalage
with the king in order to build a relationship of benefactoria with his foster-
father. Once the land is transferred to the count, he in turn grants it to Velite,
who will be free to choose his lord. In both transactions, the one who receives
the land (first the count and then Velite) repays the donation with horses,
which places servants and aristocrats in the same plane. Finally, should Velite
die without heirs the land will pass on to the monastery of Sahagún for the sal-
vation of his soul, that of his patron and the king’s, since the latter provided the
land.138 The bond of vassalage between the count and the king is not confused
with the fosterage relationship; at most it could be argued that it conditions
the relationship between the count and his foster-father: it allows the former to
134 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 1086 (1102): Et habui ego Citi Albariz ipso solare de
incartacione de comite Pedro Ansuriz et de sua mulier, propter filios eorum que ego nutriui
… Facio tibi carta per tale foro quomodo ille comes michi fecit et vadas cum eo ubi volueris,
tu et filius tuus et omnis progenie tua.
135 Barton 1997, p. 47. Also Morsel 2008, pp. 83–4, suggests that fosterage was an aristocratic
practice aimed at the consolidation of friendly relationships.
136 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 638 (1064): tibi criado nostro … Et damus cum eos foro …
et ares quantum potueris.
137 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 675 (1068): Do tibi ista corte quammichi petisti pro ad amo
tuo Velliti Albaret.
138 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 675 and 676 (1068).
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endow with lands and it imposes on the latter the obligation to transfer it post
mortem to another sector of the aristocracy. This comes to fruition forty years
later;139 thus, a clientelar practice (land endowment to compensate fosterage
services) contributes to the formation of church patrimony.
The participation of servants in the fosterage relationship and the special
esteem in which they are held by their lords, as seen in Njal’s saga, help us
understand the gifts of land to dependents with whom aristocrats have estab-
lished clientelar bonds. While in the first gift Velite is subject to providing
labour services, in the second gift (the count’s through Alfonso vi) no rents
are mentioned, which allows for the interpretation of the covenant as a pro-
motion compensating Velite for his fosterage of the count; indeed, Velite will
be able to freely dispose of the lands he were to obtain through purchase or
other methods,140 which sets him apart from the servile condition.141 The pro-
motion of unfree persons who have acted as fosterers is a common occurrence:
in 1155 countess Elvira Velázquiz grants freedom to the family who raised her,
stipulating they can ‘go wherever they want’ and not pay tribute (a nullo ho-
mine obsequium reddant).142 The donations granted to collazos, generally con-
sidered servile dependents, who reciprocate the gift of lands with swords,143
can also be understood in similar terms; it has also been suggested that this
word derives from collacteus, whose primitive sense is associated with artifi-
cial kinship.144
In these examples the covenant of benefactoria is a formula for the promo-
tion of dependent individuals with whom the aristocracy maintains an ambi-
valent bond ranging from the demand for rents to the compensation for other
types of services. In this sense, the predominance of the feudalmode of produc-
tion is compatible with the persistence of archaic customs among members
139 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 1155 (1107).
140 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 675 (1068): ut habeat ipsa corte cum omni hereditate que
ad ipso solare pertinet; et quantum super hoc ganauerit uel plantauerit uel hedificauerit uel
etiam comparauerit, liberam habeat possidendi potestatem.
141 Pérez Prendes yMuñozdeArraco 1988, Fuero de León (o), tit. x. On this norm, see Sánchez
Albornoz 1976b, pp. 221–49.
142 Muñoz y Romero 1847, p. 162: Et deditmihi illa comitesa donaGelvira de quam fuit criatione,
facio vobis cartam ingenuitatis et libertatis, ut redeunde, vivendi, laremque fovendi vitam
vestram ubi volueritis.
143 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 887 (1092).
144 According to Estepa Díez 2003, p. 52, those who gave this kind of gifts would actually be
milites. This is hard to accept in the case of Velite Álvarez, to whom labour services were
imposed.
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of the aristocracy, who should not be viewed as external agents of the social
practice they modify but rather as social actors who still partake in some of its
contents which they partially negate.
In some cases, the land recipient has been brought up by the patron. In
1059, Diego Pátriz accepts lands from his foster-father, who is a member of a
comital family. The text specifies that he will not be allowed to serve another
lord as long as his patron is alive.145 More than thirty years later, Diego Pátriz
cedes the land to the monastery of Sahagún for the salvation of his soul and
to free himself from all ‘human service’,146 which means his sons, who retain
usufruct, will be subject to seigneurial exploitation. Our client, who deems that
the obligations often imposed by the abbot are very stringent – a perspective
that sets him apart from the relation of serfdom – requests that his children
be afforded some consideration when they are taxed, and that they be allowed
to serve as knights if they have a horse.147 It follows that this must have been
the service he provided for his own patron, and that he has not been able to
knight his sons, which leads us to deduce that he is of peasant origin. The
example illustrates the precarious situation of some of the parties in these
agreements (peasants eventually equipped with horses) and the loss of their
economic autonomy over the course of two generations, a tendency that must
be considered in conjunctionwith that of social advancement. Thedegradation
of the political autonomy of the clients characteristic of the evolution of these
bonds, is combined with mechanisms of accumulation specific to another
sector of the aristocracy (the absorption of lands through grants pro anima),
just as in the case of the count’s foster-father examined above, which suggests
that the evolution of clientelar relations has been subordinated to the global
reproduction of the dominant class.
Fosterage bonds, as we have seen in Njal’s saga, are binding. This content
favours the consolidation of stable links and could explain the lasting quality
of the covenants, an aspect that contradicts the theoretical ability to change
allegiances. Witness the case examined above, where the client serves his
145 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 606 (1059): Facio cartulam donationis … de hereditate
mea propria quam habui ex patre meo comite Guttier Afonso … Do et dono ipso solare tibi
suprascripto Diaco propter creacionem quam sub Deo creaui te et propter seruicium bono …
Tantum in diebus nostris non permitto te seruire cum illo alio domno.
146 Herrerode la Fuente 1988b, doc. 909 (1093):non solumpro remedioanimamee, verumetiam
et ut ego sim liber in omnia vita mea de omni servicio humano.
147 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 909 (1093): Et filii mei non subiugati tam stricti sint in
servicio sicut ceteri, sed ut tantummodo ponant xiim dies in anno ad servicium domni
abbatis; quos si habuerit kavallos serviant sicut kavallarii.
peasant mode of production 193
patron and foster-father for life, not only by virtue of the land he is gifted but
also by virtue of a bond of family loyalty obliging him to assume his patron’s
enmities and remain at his service. This double commitment is palpable in the
services he calls ‘human services’ that he has provided for his foster-father for
over thirty years, as distinguished from the tribute demanded by the abbot of
Sahagún, which he considers a form of subjection (et filii mei non subiugati tam
stricti sint in servicio sicut ceteri).
A privilege granted by Alfonso vi to the monastery of Samos prohibiting
milites from having vassals per amatiatum sive criandum and punishing the
locals who raised the children ofmilites confirms the spread of fosterage bonds
during the eleventh century. This suggests that the inhabitants resorted to
this bond to avoid their obligations toward the monastery,148 and that it was
habitual for milites and peasants to establish dealings of this kind, which the
abbot suppresses in his attempt to impose his lordship over the place. From
this we can deduce that the fosterage bond is distinguishable from a relation
of exploitation, even when the child-giver and the feudal lord are designated
with the same word (qui se amo fecerit vel qui se in alium dominum transtulerit,
ad dominum monasterii reducat), which supports the notion that it is derived
from practices of the peasant mode.
The type of relationship established between families linked by fosterage
bonds also explainswhy clients become involved in their patrons’ disputes. The
twelfth-century regulations address this issue: a decree of Alfonso ix forbids
lords from seizing property belonging to clients of other lords due to debts or
enmities that the interested parties could hold against their patrons unless the
clients were armed with lances.149 It follows from this that military support
was the norm among clients even if they were not fully equipped, and that
they were vulnerable to the aggression of their patrons’ enemies even if they
did not participate in military activities. The fact that seigneurial behaviour
toward someone else’s clients is regulated points to a qualitative change, given
that it transfers the problem from the sphere of conflict between families,
which implicated clients in their patrons’ disputes, to the sphere of the conflict
between lords whosemain bone of contention are the clients of rival lords and
their possessions.
148 De Hinojosa 1919, p. 96: Et si aliquis filius militis ibi nutritor vel aliquis ibi se posuit sub alio
dominonisi subdomino samonensis,mando isti hominimeo, quod filiummilitis, qui in cautos
samonensis nutritor, foras de cautos eiciat.
149 DeHinojosa 1919, p. 148: quodnullus pignoret benefactoriamprodebito vel inimicitiadomine
benefactorie, nisi ipse beneficiatus fuerit lancearius.
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The link between the benefactoria and the practice of fosterage is confirmed
in documents from the laterMiddleAges related to behetrías (lordships derived
from relations of benefactoria) which regulate aspects related to intra-lordly
conflict: a fifteenth-century ordinance urges neighbours to defend the ruling
lord from the interference of other powers; it stipulates that should a neigh-
bour die in these circumstances, the local council shall raise his children.150
This late example reflects the residual survival of peasant practices voided of
substance, where the involvement of neighbours in their leaders’ disputes no
longer expresses a clientelar bond but the exercise of political rights on the part
of the lord, which oblige the locals to fight in the ranks of the magnate whose
lordship over the area is at stake.
The Power to Choose a Lord
Instability is a characteristic feature of the leaderships in peasant mode soci-
eties. In Iceland, each free man who is the head of a household must be
attached to a goði, whom he can both choose and abandon. The goði’s author-
ity, regardless of the heritability of the position, depends on his ascendancy
over the men attached to his leadership, who can withdraw their allegiance
and attach themselves to another chieftain.151 We have reviewed an example
from Eyrbyggja saga, when Thorolf transfers his allegiance to Snorri goði. Njal’s
saga provides a paradigmatic case: Mord, who has inherited his position as
goði, loses all his followers to Hoskuld (Njal’s foster-son); the site where the
assembly used to be held, normally equipped with makeshift structures, is in a
state of neglect becausewhen changing allegiances themen have shifted to the
location where their chosen chieftain holds the assembly.152 The community
has real existence when the individual proprietors gather in an assembly;153
concomitantly, the authority has real existence only when the leader enjoys
the effective support of the individual proprietors: when losing his followers,
Mord also loses the powers of the chieftaincy over which he holds hereditary
rights.
The texts regulating benefactoria relations refer to the faculty to elect a lord
for the subscribers of a covenant, the recipients of a fuero or those who accept
150 Oliva Herrer 2003, p. 201.
151 On chieftancies in medieval Iceland, see Chris Wickham’s chapter in this book. See also
JónViðar Sigurðsson 1995, p. 155;Helgui Þorláksson 2005, pp. 139–40; Byock 2001, pp. 119–20
and 126–8.
152 Njal’s saga, ch. 107.
153 Marx 1964, p. 78.
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gifts of land. This faculty is addressed in the legislation.154 In general, the coven-
ants of eleventh-century Castile and León do not contain restrictions regarding
the clients’ bonds: the typical expressions are vadas cum eo ubi volueris, or
ad unos aut alios domnos, qui tibi bene fecerit, etc. These formulae reflect an
acknowledgement of the land recipient’s free condition (or his promotion to
a free condition), seeing as one of the attributes of freedom is the ability to
change allegiance.
In a majority of the charters, the subscriber of this type of covenant can in
theory abandon the chosen lord and is free to lend his support to different
members of the aristocracy.155 He can choose, for example ‘a king, a count, a
bishop, an abbot, in Castile, in Galicia’,156 that is to say, hewill pick his lord from
the pool of the aristocracy and without geographical limits. In other charters
the aristocratic spectrum is identified with the twomain lineages, that of Banu
Mirel and that of AlfonsoDíaz.157 Although this limitation restricts the number
of potential patrons, in theory those who present certain qualities are eligible,
as happens in peasant societies (in Iceland, for example, the men choose a
chieftain from among a limited number of goðar), which acknowledeges that
clients hold a certain political protagonism. This criterion undergoes a shift
when patrons take the side of one of the two main lineages on referring to
the election of a lord, thus constraining significantly the spectrum of possible
political alliances for their clients.158 Finally the election of a lord will be
restricted to the patron’s lineage.159 In certain cases the patrons restrict their
clients’ bonds to specific persons of their family group: Urraca, a member
of the lineage of Alfonso Díaz, stipulates that the individual to whom she
154 Pérez Prendes y Muñoz de Arraco 1988, Fuero de León (o), tit. xiii: Praecipimus adhuc, ut
homo qui est de benefactoria, cum omnibus bonis et haereditatibus suis eat liber quocumque
voluerit.
155 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 566 (1054), 624 (1063), 634 (1063), 676 (1068), 702 (1071), 713
(1072), 719 (1973); Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, 737 (1074), 778 (1080), 788 (1080), 795 (1081),
818 (1085), 824 (1086), 825 (1086), 887 (1092), 1015 (1097), 1086 (1102), 1173 (1085); Fernández
Flórez 1991, doc. 1189 (1113), 1198 (1117), 1252 (1133); Ruiz Asencio 1987, doc. 894 (1031); Ruiz
Asencio 1990, doc. 1233 (1084).
156 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 804 (1083).
157 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 752 (1077).
158 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 1077 (1101): Vadatis cum illo inter filios et neptos de Vani
Mirelliz; doc. 811 (1084): inter casata de Vani Mirel ad quale tibi melius fecerit; Ruiz Asencio
1990, doc. 1192 (1073): et vadeas cumeomedio die etmedia ora inter VaniMirel qui tiuimelior
fecerit tu et filiis tuis et neptis tuis vel viisneptis.
159 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 1096 (1103), 1125 (1105), 826 (1086), 893 (1092), 959 (1095);
Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, doc. 549 (1051).
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has ceded lands, Rexendo, will be allowed to choose among the children and
grandchildren of two of her brothers, the daughters of one sister, and the men
of the monastery of Sahagún.160 According to the data available on this family,
Rexendo will be able to choose from among twenty people. This evolution
tending to the limitation of the clients’ allegiances is also evidenced when
patrons secure services until their deaths.161
The imposition of serving one lord for life and remaining within the orbit
of one family reflects the infusion of new meaning into the peasant practice,
which tends to place itself at the service of feudal logic while preserving the
vocabulary of liberty. The relative independence of the remaining free peas-
antry in a feudalised context accounts for the preservation of the formula
regarding the election of the lord and also the successive curtailments it under-
goes in practice, which are progressively incorporated into the texts. This pro-
cess is enabled by some contents of the peasant practice. The fosterage bond,
for example, facilitates the patron’s tendency to restrict the circle of eligible
lords to his family members. When the patron is both lord and child-giver,
foster-son or foster-father, the essential content of the fosterage bond stimu-
lates the formation of permanent clienteles and contributes to the degradation
of the political autonomy of free proprietors. It follows that some aspects of the
dynamics of the peasantmode can promote an evolution tomore stable bonds,
which contributes to the readaptation of social practice to the requisites of aris-
tocratic dominance.
The tendency to restrict the election of the lord to members of the pat-
ron’s own lineage is nascent during the eleventh century and dominant in the
twelfth century, when benefactoria relationships no longer refer to individuals
but to communities as a whole, which, for their part, have constituted them-
selves legally as such as inferred from the references to local authorities. The
inhabitants of Andaluz, for instance, will choose a lord from among the kins-
men of the count who has granted them a set of norms.162 The election of the
lord has now become a collective practice: the community will have to choose
160 Herrerode la Fuente 1988a, doc. 620 (1062): Etpostmortemmeamuadas inter filios etneptos
de fratribus meis domno Monio et domno Gutier aut inter filias de domna Adosinda, soror
mea, nominatas Goto et Monia, aut a domnos de Sancto Facundo, uel qui tibi melior fecerit.
161 Herrero de la Fuente 1988a, 606 (1059), 620 (1062), 721 (1073); Herrero de la Fuente 1988b,
doc. 952 and 953 (1095), 728 (1074).
162 Fuero de Andaluz: hayan behetría entre mis fijos e mis nietos e en todo mi linaie, cited
by Sánchez-Albornoz 1976b, p. 209. This fuero is a translation from the original Latin
version to Romance, available at: http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Fuero_de_la_Comunidad
_de_Villa_y_Tierra_de_Andaluz_de_1098.
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the one preferred by the majority.163 The higher powers’ interest in disciplin-
ing the political bonds of the community is evidenced in the twelfth-century
legislation: in 1104, count García Ordóñez prohibits the coexistence of diver-
ging alliances in Fresnillo, forcing the locals to choose from among one of his
descendants.164 The same preoccupation is observed in the laws imposed on
the people of Escalona in 1130, which tend to standardise the allegiances of the
neighbours and restrict them to the family of the local dominus.165 The fuero of
Belbimbre of 1187 attempts to suppress the establishment of multiple alliances
in the same village by stipulating that the locals should not submit to more
than one lord.166 The same law allowsmilites to attach themselves to a lord of
their choosing,167 which confirms that the ability to choose one’s lord is asso-
ciated with freedom, and that in the twelfth century this concept is becoming
exclusively identified with a privilege.
The Practice of Hospitality and the Requirement of Tribute
Contributing to the support of the itinerant court is a public burden, just as
military service and attendance to the assembly; it is likely that the supply of
victuals for the lord when he passed through a locality constituted an informal
service not expressly mentioned in the texts. This practice is consistent with
services rendered by the clients, which we have understood as derived from
the forms of reciprocal exchange typical of the peasant mode. In one of the
Sahagún documents, the gift of lands is repaid with bread, wine, clothes and
shoes,168 which could have symbolised hospitality, in the same way that horses
163 Sánchez Albornoz 1976b, Fuero de Andaluz: Et ser todos dun sennor et do fueren la mayor
partida que vayan los otros.
164 De Hinojosa 1919, p. 47, Fuero de Fresnillo, tit. 13: Et non intretis in temptacione nec
particione, sed abeatis benefectria cum vestras causas ad filiis nostris vel neptis seu ad
qualem vobis placuerit aut meliore fecerit, ut ipsi serviatis.
165 Muñoz y Romero 1847, p. 485: Vos vero in diebus nostris non eritis divisi et post nostram
mortem et filiis nostris cui volueritis et melior vobis fecerit, ipse servite cum omnia vestra
bona.
166 Martínez Díez 1982, p. 179, Fuero de Belbimbre y sus cuatro aldeas, year 1187, tit. 9: Omnes
habitatores … unius tantum domini prestamerii adhereatis, et nulli liceat uos per partes
diuidere, aud plurium dominorum dominatui subicere.
167 Martínez Díez 1982, Fuero de Belbimbre y sus cuatro aldeas (1187), tit. 5: Preterea omnibus
uobis qui milites fueritis in Beneuiuere et in predictis quatuor barriis indulgeo et concedo
quod nullam facenderam pectetis, et habeatis dominos quales habere uolueritis et domos
uestras liberas possideatis.
168 Herrero de la Fuente 1988b, doc. 824 (1086): Accepimus de uobis in pretio, in pane et in vino
et in vestire et in calcare, apreciatura in cl solidos.
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and swords symbolised military service. The possession of military tenancies
carries the obligation to offer meals to the lord when he passes through the
territory.169 According to the literature on this subject, hospitality services are
a part of the duties of those who take in foster-children and receive lands in
exchange for their loyalty.170 These are the services referred to in thedocuments
on primitive behetrías, according to which the knights ‘ate the victuals they
found’.171
The transition frommilitary obligations and voluntary contributions of food
to the payment of agrarian rents has been considered in relation to the emer-
gence of feudal relations of exploitation. Carlos Astarita has proposed that this
transition is reflected in imprecise formulae in which the tribute is not yet con-
ceived of as a regular exaction, nor has it acquired yet a stable composition;
instead there is a prevalence of demands whosemanner takes into account the
will of the inhabitants (quantum poterint ad comite, etc.).172 In the tribal soci-
eties of Northern Europe, the transition to the feudal mode is seen, according
to Wickham, in the mutation of the ‘tribal’ tribute, a light contribution, into
rents that are more complex, more onerous and susceptible to commercial-
isation; another expression of this transition to relations of exploitation is the
demand for hospitality tributes by a growing number of persons.173 In what
concerns our analysis, the transformation of the services rendered by clients
into agrarian rents represents the full incorporation of these individuals and
their social forms into the dominant feudal dynamic of the area, which con-
stitutes one aspect of the general process of expansion of feudalism over free
spaces.
The demand for rents of a definite kind appears associatedwith the benefac-
toria in documents from the early twelfth century. In 1125, the norms imposed
on the people of San Cebrián, who are allowed to choose their lord,174 establish
the amounts due as rent. The villagers are exempted from some taxes and the
fine for homicide is cut in half; in exchange, they must hand over thirty loaves
of bread, a certain amount of wine, and one side of bacon or one ram as long
169 García de Valdeavellano 1955 (Apéndice documental, doc. xii): unum prandium semel in
anno de debito in omnibus expensis, si contigerit me facere transitum per terram illam.
170 Parkes 2006, p. 363.
171 López de Ayala 1991, p. 42 (Crónica de Don Pedro i, ii, ch. xiv).
172 Astarita 2003–6, p. 34.
173 Wickham 2005, pp. 344–9.
174 De Hinojosa 1919, Fuero de San Cebrián, year 1125: Do vobis benefetria … ut tornetis ad
qualem seniorem volueritis quem villa mandauerit.
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as they are able to obtain these products from their labour.175 This condition
could reflect a formative stage of the new social relations (the imposition of
burdens on free people), in which the tribute, compulsory and defined as it is,
preserves on paper its character as a more or less flexible supply of food. The
delivery of agrarian surpluses is formally presented as a reciprocal exchange:
the lord must treat the council to a meal.176 It is noteworthy that although a
tribute is being imposed on direct producers, hospitality is ostensibly an oblig-
ation of the lord, which allows for a transfer of surplus while preserving the
formality of reciprocity. Just as in the case of previously examined practices,
the dominant feudal logic of the area introduces new content while leaving
intact the appearance of the custom, although in this case, in contrast to the
early eleventh-century covenants, the archaic references are marginal, and the
new contents reflect the full incorporation of these social forms into the feudal
mode of production. In the locality of Andaluz, for instance, the rents that the
locals will pay are established; the villagers can choose a lord from among the
kinsmen of the count who has granted them a fuero; he who is chosen shall
hold a feast for the community.177 The continuance of food services on the part
of the lord and the feasts he holds for the villagerswhohave chosen or accepted
him as lord could have their precedent in the collective celebrations of peasant
societies. In Laxdæla saga this practice is related to the need of legitimation:
the feast that Olaf the Peacock, a renowned goði, holds for a large crowd of
people in memory of his late father, who favoured Olaf in the distribution of
the inheritance despite his being an illegitimate son, is aimed at Olaf ’s pub-
lic validation as truly deserving his father’s favour and the support the latter
enjoyed.178
In the twelfth century these public feasts are replacedwithmoney payments
from the lord. The fuero of Lara of 1135, for example, obliges the people to
deliver meat for the lord and his retinue when they visit the locality; the local
authorities shall appraise the victuals and the lord shall pay for them, otherwise
the villagers can deprive him of the food without being penalised.179 Here we
175 DeHinojosa 1919, Fuero de SanCebrián, tit. 15: Si colegerit de suaheriditate det istum forum,
et si non colegerit non det … si habuerit porcos aut oves det, et si non habuerit non det.
176 De Hinojosa 1919, Fuero de San Cebrián, tit. 12: Et dominus det concilio … unum iantarem.
177 Sánchez Albornoz 1976b, Fuero de Andaluz, 1.
178 Laxdæla saga, ch. 27.
179 Martínez Díez 1982, p. 141, Fuero de Lara, year 1135, tit. 38: Quando uenerit dominus Lare
in illam ciuitatem, accipiat ille iudex cum suo saione karne por espesa, et aprecient illam
karnemhomines de conceio, et det fidiatore [in blank]merino et pectet eum; nisi non dederit
fidiatore illo merino, tollat eum et non habeat calumnia.
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observe on the one hand the conversion of feasts offered by the lord intomoney
payments, andon theother hand the conversionof the spontaneoushospitality
of the villagers into an obligation.
The reference to hospitality service in twelfth-century texts, which regu-
late the election of the lord or refer to this right, confirm that it was common
practice to provide hospitality for the lord, and that it was beginning to be reg-
ulated during the period in question. This regulation sets limits pertaining to
the group of service providers, which tend to be identifiedwith peasant labour-
ers: the 1135 fuero of Lara exempts those who own a horse and clergy from the
obligation to provide shelter;180 the fuero of Villadiego exempts knights and
priests;181 the set of norms imposed on the inhabitants of Villavicencio in 1156
frees knights from the obligation to house the lord.182
This legislation by which the obligation to provide shelter falls only on the
farm labourers coexists with another in which the will of the latter is ambigu-
ously contemplated, and at the same time it becomes apparent that hospitality
services are being demanded by force. In the fuero of Escalona of 1130 we read:
posadasper forcia, nondonent.183 In a studyon theLatin vocabulary inCaroling-
ian documents, Kuchenbuch suggests that the verbdonare, which is rarely used
and associatedwithmansi ingenuiles, could be an indicator of the higher status
of the people from whom tribute is being demanded, and that its use could
reflect new impositions.184 According to this perspective, our example could
reflect the tendency to impose hospitality services on people who had not pre-
viously been subjected to taxation. The inhabitants of Villavicencio must also
‘donate’ a certain amount of food and ‘no more, unless they do so of their own
accord’.185 The ambivalent wording in the demands for this type of encum-
brance from free people, which references both the will of the villagers and
180 Martínez Díez 1982, Fuero de Lara, year 1135, tit. 44: Quando uenerit dominus Lare in illam
ciuitatem, per mano de illo saione accipiant illos caualleros posadas, et non posent in casa
de qui cauallo ouiere, necque in casa de uidua necque in casa de clerico, nisi fuerit clericus.
181 MartínezDíez 1982, p. 137, Fuero deVilladiego, year 1134, tit. 13: Et in casade caualleroneque
de clerigo neque de vidua non posset nullus homo.
182 Muñoz y Romero 1847, p. 176, Fuero de Villavicencio: Et qui pausare voluerit in illa villa,
pauset in suis et postquam casas de suos homines fuerint plenas pausent per alios, set non in
casa de caballero.
183 Muñoz y Romero 1847, p. 487, Fuero de Escalona.
184 Kuchenbuch 2003, pp. 206–9.
185 Muñoz y Romero 1847, Fuero de Villavicencio, year 1156: Donet pro suo foro decem panes,
et media kanatellam de vino, et uno quarto de carnero, et duos lombos non magis, nisi sua
sponte.
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seigneurial violence, is observed in the fuero of Belbimbre of 1187, which stip-
ulates that the lord shall not break into the judge’s house186 and contemplates
the wishes of the host after three days of compulsory housing.187
The regulation of hospitality services involving the obligations of both lords
and peasants as well as lordly abuse is more fully developed in laws related to
lordships of behetría which spell out in detail the manner in which taxpayers
must provide food, clothing and accomodation to their lords and the payments
the latter must render for the victuals, which must be consumed in situ.188 The
texts regulating these services allude to certain older legislation whose exist-
ence historians have verified and dated to the period between 1184 and 1185.189
This legislation, whose spirit is consistent with the laws of that period, may
be derived from the need to regulate the people’s relations with the noblemen
among whom they picked a lord, probably members of the lineage with more
influence in the area, who attempt to formalise their condition as potential
lords and materialise in defined rents their right to be chosen as such.
During the twelfth century, the hospitality services, which everyone must
render on principle, tend to become concentrated in one social sector defined
by its exclusion from privilege and to be demanded by an increasing number
of persons; the regularity and composition of the service are established albeit
preserving the ceremonial aspect of reciprocity on the part of the lord, whose
prodigality is limited first to public feasts and later to money payments to the
service providers. This conventional generosity of the lord couldbe linked tohis
symbolic legitimation as tax levier, which comes into being through practices
that are formally analogous to the ones that secured his leadership in the
pre-class society.
186 Martínez Díez 1982, Fuero de Belbimbre y sus cuatro aldeas (1187), tit. 17: In domo iudicis
nullus dominus uiolenter hospitetur.
187 Martínez Díez 1982, Fuero de Belbimbre y sus cuatro aldeas (1187), tit. 10: In quacumque
domo prestamerum hospitali contingerit … ultra trium dierum spacium contra uoluntatem
hospitis sui prestamerus solo uno momento moram non faciat.
188 Códigos españoles concordados y anotados: Fuero Viejo de Castilla and Ordenamiento
de Alcalá de Henares de 1348 (hereafter fvc and oa). Lords must pay what they have
consumed (fvc, i, viii, 1); local inhabitants must report themselves, otherwise they will
be punished (fvc, i, viii, 2); lords will demand hospitality, foodstuff and clothing (fvc,
i, viii, 3); straw for their horses and wine (fvc, i, viii, 1), firewood (fvc, i, viii, 4), and
vegetables (fvc, i, viii, 5); the whole process shall be supervised by boni homines in order
to prevent lordly abuse (oa, xxxii, xxviii).
189 oa, xxxii; Barbero and Loring García 1991, pp. 27ff.
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Conclusions
In contrast to the criterionemployedbyWickhamtoconceptualise exploitative
modes of production by which they are reduced to forms of surplus extraction,
his concept of the peasant mode accounts for the elements intervening in the
productive process, for relations of production and property, for the logic of
social functioning and the conditions for its genesis, reproduction and trans-
formation. The elements deriving from the disposition of the product (low
intensity of labour, reciprocity) are consistent with those of ‘primitive’ societ-
ies in different historical contexts. It follows that productive forces, and even
relations of production, do not singularise a mode of production. A mode of
production, according to the Formen, implies a form of property at its base.
From this perspective, the peasant mode as it appears in Western Europe can
be basically identified with the Germanic mode, which is why it could be con-
ceived of as a re-elaboration of the latter devotedmainly to developing aspects
of its functioning laws. These elements were assessed on the analytic level of
the social formation, since they allow for the characterisation of the forms of
articulation between the aristocracy and free communities, and in our case
highlight the process of subordination of the latter to the feudal mode of pro-
duction.
This process undergoes different stages characterised by the formal preser-
vation of peasantmode practices and the progressive negation of its contents –
or the subordination of the practice to already existingmechanisms of accumu-
lation. Peasant practices, in turn, contain elements that favour the advance of
the feudal logic. The gifts of lands in return for services ofmediation and repres-
entation, a tool for status negotiation in peasant societies, become functional
to the formation of aristocratic patrimony; the practice of fosterage, founded
on reciprocity, contributes to the stabilisation of bonds. To the extent that this
is achieved and political structure becomes less dependent on the conform-
ity and support of peasant sectors (or, as Engels would put it, to the extent
that social functions become independent from society), the aristocratic logic
findsmore space to deploy itselfmore openly. This is evidenced in the spread of
oppressive practices on free people, which could explain themutation of spon-
taneous contributions of victuals into hospitality rents that the lords seize by
force in the period prior to their regulation. Thus, the condition of possiblity
of seigneurial violence that historians associate with the rise of banal lordship
would have been an earlier period of symbolic violence and reworking of the
peasant practice during which stable bonds of subordination were consolid-
ated.
The transformation of free clients into tenants subject to rent or feudal vas-
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sals is one of the forms of expansion of feudalism. Since in our case we begin
with a social formation in which the aristocracy coexists with autonomous
nuclei, the advance over these nuclei by means of the recruitment of vassals
among the peasantry or the conversion of free clients into taxpayers reflects
the dissolution of peasant societies and therefore the transition fromonemode
of production to another. This transition can be explained by the prevalence
of individual private property susceptible to disposition and fragmentation
which characterises the peasantmode at its base and underlies the social prac-
tices reflecting its social functioning. These social practices feature transac-
tions involving land, which in turn implies the individual’s emancipation from
community and kin. Furthermore, the social functioning of the peasant mode,
based on the logic of the gift, constrains the possibilities of accruingwealth and
requires costly strategies on the part of those who attempt to build or main-
tain a position of power, which must rest on material concessions, respect for
custom and mechanisms invoking the ideology of reciprocity. Even though in
societies where feudalism has developed the peasant mode holds a subordin-
ate position in the social formation, its principles condition the actions of the
aristocracy. This delays the expansion of the new social relations and determ-
ines its modalities, which we have characterised as gradual and ambivalent.
Both the form of property and the social relations of the peasantmode carry
evolutionary tendencies (to dispossession in the former, and to conservation
or slow pace of accumulation in the latter) that combine in the historical
process, as we have demonstrated in the empirical study of clientelar relations
in Northern Spain, whose transformation into exploitative forms drags on for
over a century and involves strategies of concession toward the free peasantry.
These tendencies depict a dynamic proper to the peasant mode which is not
contingent but derived from the structural traits of this mode of production:
it is contained in the asymmetric substance of the gift and the potentialities
of individual property, which undermine egalitarianism. This dynamic, as we
have seen, can explain the structural transformations.
